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Foreword
In September 1997, I gave a seminar 'Financial aspects of the NT Land Rights Act:
a critical evaluation and proposals for change' at the Centre for Aboriginal
Economic Policy Research. This seminar was based on long-term research on
these issues that I have been undertaking since 1982, including the chairing of a
review of the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account (ABTA) in 1984 and participation
in a working party that again reviewed the ABTA in 1989.
Subsequently, a summary of this seminar was provided to John Reeves QC
who included it as a short section (pps 9-11) in his issues paper 'Review of the
Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) Act 1976' of December 1997. At that time I negotiated
to assist Mr Reeves as a consultant to the review on two of its terms of reference,
namely:
• the operations of the Aboriginals Benefit Reserve (formally the ABTA)
including the distributions out of the Trust Account; and
• the operations of the royalty associations and their reporting requirements.
Unfortunately, owing to other pressing work commitments, I withdrew this
offer of assistance late in 1997. However, early in 1998, Mr David Pollack from the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission's (ATSIC) Native Title and Land
Rights Branch joined CAEPR on a secondment. Mr Pollack had considerable
experience in working in both the Northern Territory and Canberra on the issues
raised by these terms of reference. Consequently, I re-negotiated with Mr Reeves
to provide a small-scale consultancy report on these issues, to be jointly prepared
by Mr Pollack and myself during March and April 1998. Mr Pollack was able to
visit Darwin and work with the review team in April 1998. A condition of the
consultancy agreement was that all intellectual property rights in the research
material shall vest upon its creation with us, with the proviso that nothing was to
be released in public prior to completion of the review and provision of a final
report to the Minister (for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs).
The decision to quickly publish this report as a CAEPR Discussion Paper
has been made for two reasons. First, there is a great deal of information of public
interest in our consultancy report 'NT Land Rights Review: Financial Aspects' that
was not included in Mr Reeves's final report Building on Land Rights for the Next
Generation: Report of the Review of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory)
Act 1976. Second, there was a significant divergence between the broad approach
that we recommended, which sought incremental change to the financial
operations of the Land Rights Act and Mr Reeves's proposed major restructuring.
The content of this discussion paper has not altered since it was submitted
as a consultancy report to the reviewer in May 1998 apart from the inclusion of
Table 3 at page 7. Some amendments have been made for editorial purposes, and
statistical information submitted as appendices in the original have been included
as tables in the text. Given that it is likely that there will be further public debate
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about the Reeves recommendations, we thought it useful to have our perspectives
widely available to facilitate this debate.
Professor Jon Altman
Director, CAEPR
October 1998
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Summary
In July 1997 the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, Senator
The Hon John Herron, announced that the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976 would be reviewed. Senator Herron appointed Mr John Reeves
QC to undertake the review. Mr Reeves submitted his report Building on Land
Rights for the Next Generation: Report of the Review of the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 to the Minister in August 1998.
This Discussion Paper focuses on financial aspects of the legislation. Since
commencement of the legislation in 1977, approximately $400 million in mining
royalty equivalents (MREs) have been transferred from the Commonwealth's
Consolidated Revenue Fund to the Aboriginals Benefit Reserve (ABR) (previously
the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account). In accordance with the legislation this
amount has been disbursed to other institutions, including land councils and
royalty associations, and to incorporated bodies to be used for the benefit of
Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory. In the 20 years of the operations of
the legislation the apportionment of these funds has never been substantially
reviewed nor rigorously contested.
The review provided an opportunity to resolve a number of long-standing
issues which have historical legacies and have proven to be ambiguous and
contestable in their application. These include the proportional division of ABR
receipts, the public or private nature of MREs, the usage of those moneys and the
imposition of Mining Withholding Tax (MWT). This Discussion Paper argues that
many of the institutions created by the legislation are operating suboptimally and
that the review provided the potential to clearly define the role and objectives of
the financial institutions created in the Land Rights Act. Current developments
such as the prospect of statehood for the Northern Territory become important
issues for examination particularly in the context of Commonwealth/Territory
relations and the governance of the ABRin the 21st century.
This paper also discusses the heterogeneous evolution of royalty
associations noting that blanket recommendations are difficult to apply given that
royalty associations have operated variably both over the life cycle of individual
organisations, compared to other indigenous organisations, and in the context of
wider political and economic forces. Notwithstanding the comments of this paper,
and the recommendations of the review, there remains an urgent need for further
research and assessment of performance of these associations in order to evaluate
past performance and future viability. Nevertheless, it is apparent that some
immediate amendments to the legislation are required particularly in the area of
accountability measures, clarification in respect of the purpose of mining royalty
equivalents and the provision of mentoring services for the future development of
royalty associations.
The policy implications of reviewing the financial aspects of the Land Rights Act
that has been in place for over 20 years is very complex. A selection of our
recommendations with significant policy implications follow. In respect to the
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ABR, a unique institution in its own right, we contend that it is operating
suboptimally owing primarily to a lack of an institutional vision and mission. It is
important that this issue is addressed, and that a clear role or amalgam of roles
is created. Options we envisage include:
• maintaining the status quo—the ABR as a clearing house with a minor role
as a reserve;
• an Investment House—set an investment goal (eg. self-sufficiency) and
identify the purpose and type of assistance to, or for, the benefit of
Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory (economic development);
• a Development Corporation—set a vision with a focus on the development of
Aboriginal land with a commercial orientation; and
• a Sociocultural Corporation—set a vision with the primary objective as the
maintenance of indigenous culture and society and a complimentary focus
on employment creation.
All these options cannot, in our view, be addressed immediately, partly
because of the need to reach consensus among all affected parties. This paper
recommends the establishment of a working party with representatives from the
land councils, ABR, Northern Territory Government, and commerce to address
this particular issue. Conceivably the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC) would establish the working party.
It is apparent that there are a number of other issues which need to be
addressed immediately. Therefore as a first step to reform we make the following
recommendations:
• that a rigorous assessment of the implications of the new Commonwealth
auditing regime be undertaken in order to gauge its full impact upon the
institutions created by the Land RightsAct;
• that the point at which MREs change from public moneys to become private
moneys is investigated;
• that mechanisms are instituted to ensure MREs are not used solely as
substitution funding;
• that the equity and efficiency implications of the MWT are again investigated
(if individual cash payments made by some royalty associations cease then
MWT logic is defeated);
• that royalty associations are consulted widely in respect to any
recommendations which might affect their commercial and service
operations;
• that amendments to the Land Rights Act be made to enhance the
accountability of royalty associations and to establish a 'mentoring' regime
within the Act;
• that royalty associations identify clear missions for themselves which are
interrelated with that of the ABR;
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that appropriate structures are put in place that differentiate commercial
activities from social activities, commercial from charitable and encourage
some alliance building with mainstream business (on a commercial front)
and other agencies, especially ATSIC regional councils but also the Northern
Territory Government, on communitydevelopmentfunctions; and
that a regime be instituted that discourages individual payments and
encourages investment.
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Aboriginals Benefit Reserve (formerly the Aboriginals
Benefit Trust Account)
With the enactment of the Financial Management and Accouniability Act 1997 and
consequential amendment of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act
1976 (ALRA), the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account (ABTA) was renamed the
Aboriginals Benefit Reserve (ABR) as of 1 January 1998.
The ABTA was created in the ALRA in December 1976, but it did not become
operational until 1 July 1978 when s.21 of the Northern Territory (Administration)
Act was repealed. The ABTA has historically played a critical role in the whole
question of Aborigines and mining royalties in the Northern Territory (NT), for it is
the primary royalty distributing institution established in the ALRA (Altman 1983:
70).
The ABTA consists of a secretariat, staffed by six public service officers of
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission's (ATSIC) NT State Office,
and a 15 member Aboriginal Advisory Committee. It has a dual role. On the one
hand, the secretariat acts as a clearing house and is responsible for the
distribution to land councils of 70 per cent of statutory mining royalty equivalents
(MREs). The proportion distributed to the lands councils for further distribution
to the 'areas affected' associations (30 per cent), occurs automatically with no
ministerial involvement. The proportion distributed to the land councils for
administrative purposes pursuant to ss.64(l) (40 per cent), and supplementary
funds pursuant to ss.64(7) are scrutinised by ATSIC Officers as the Minister is
required, under s.34 of the ALRA, to approve estimates of expenditure for the land
councils. On the other hand, the secretariat and the Advisory Committee are
responsible for advising the Minister on the distribution of ss.64(4) moneys that
can account for up to 30 per cent of the remaining MRE receipts each year.
In the period 1978/79 (when the ABTA commenced) to 1996/97 under the
so-called 40/30/30 formula, the following payments were made:
• $116 million (about 30 per cent of MREs) paid to areas affected (as distinct
from fully negotiated and potentially well defined compensation under
agreement provisions);
• $202 million (about 52.5 per cent of MREs) to fund land councils;
• $67 million (about 17.5 per cent of MREs) in grants to, or for, the benefit of
Aboriginal people in the NT (also includes ABTA administration costs)
(Altman cited in Reeves 1997: 9).
As at 31 March 1998, the net funds reserves of the ABRwas approximately
$50 million. This financial position is subject to:
• the receipt of future statutory royalty equivalents under s.63 and interest
revenues;
• payments under ss.64(4) as a consequence of the funds allocated for grants
for 1996/97 and 1997/98; and
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• the necessary payments to the land councils under ss.64(l), 64(7) and
64(3).
The actual timing and quantum of the cash inflows and outflows above
cannot at present be precisely measured. It is forecasted that the ABR will hold
reserves of about $36 million at 30 June 1998.
Notably, this is the first time the reserve has reached $50 million and minor
growth of the reserve has occurred over the last few years. While the growth can
be attributed to many factors, the most significant was the implementation of the
Financial Management Strategy (FMS) in 1994/95. This strategy was introduced
to reverse a significant decline in the reserve and was essentially an expenditure
policy rather than an investment strategy. It was premised on 'freezing' land
council administrative expenditure at 1993/94 levels, thus reducing the
expanding draw on ss.64(7) supplementary moneys. The strategy also limited
expenditure of grants pursuant to ss.64(4) to $5 million per annum and
attempted to ensure that funds in the reserve would not drop below $23 million.
One analysis of the ABR (Walter and Turnbull 1993) suggested that a figure of
$64 million would be preferred to ensure that the ABR became self-sufficient in
providing for grants under ss.64(4) fixed at $5 million per annum and to buffer it
from any dramatic downturns in revenue.
Under the original legislative framework, s.62 of the ALRA defined the ABTA
as a Trust Account for the purposes of S.63A of the Audit Act 1901. Effectively this
means that royalty equivalents paid into the ABR are public moneys. With the
repeal of the Audit Act, the trust fund became a reserve. A new legislative regime
has replaced it by the following three Acts,the:
• Auditor-General Act 1996;
• Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA); and the
• Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1996 (CAC).
There are some obvious consequences of this new regime whichinclude:
• the auditor of the land councils will be the Australian National Audit Office
(ANAO);
• tabling dates for annual reports will change; and
• criminal sanctions can be applied.
However, there are concerns that a rigorous assessment of the impact of
this new regime on the operations of the institutions created by ALRA has not
been pursued to date. Of particular concern is that land councils, as statutory
authorities, may be required to repay surplus funds to the Consolidated Revenue
Fund (CRF) at the end of each financial year, as ATSIC is required to do. The
requirement to repay surplus funds to the CRF would essentially make ss.35(l) of
the ALRA redundant. Notably, the new regime also provides for exemptions in
some areas in respect to those associations incorporated under the
Commonwealth's Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (ACAA). The
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impact of these exemptions, and whether they apply to royalty associations
incorporated under NTlegislation, has not been fully explored.
Nature of the fund—public or private?
The nature of the fund and whether MREs are public or private moneys has
long been an issue of debate and largely remains unresolved. It would appear that
the original intent of the recommendations of Woodward were that MREs were a
form of compensation which, in essence, substantiates arguments that the
moneys received by traditional owners and residents of areas affected by mining
are private. However, the mechanism by which those moneys are released by the
Commonwealth from the CRF present a strong case that the moneys are in fact
public and should be accountable in the public domain. In the 1984 review of the
ABTA, Altman (1985: 8) noted that this was an issue of significant division along
predictable lines. All representatives of Aboriginal organisations held the view that
MREs are Aboriginal moneys. The bureaucratic and legal view expressed by
members of the then Department Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) was that MREs are
public moneys.
The distinction between royalties as public or Aboriginal moneys is
significant on a number of counts. First, if royalties are Aboriginal moneys, then a
case can be made for Aboriginal organisations to administer their disbursement.
If they are public moneys, then they should, arguably, be controlled by officers of
the Australian Public Service or the like. Second, there is the question of financial
accountability. If MREs are accepted as public moneys, then Treasury-style
financial accountability may be required with justification. If MREs are Aboriginal
moneys, then accountability could be to Aboriginal bodies like land councils (who
are in fact statutory authorities of the Commonwealth and, under the new
auditing legislative framework, will be audited by the ANAO).
Regardless of the views taken by Aboriginal organisations and bureaucrats,
it is important to note that there are a variety of accountability requirements
within the ALRA regime. A high degree of accountability is required by ATSIC and
the Minister in regard to the funds disbursed pursuant to ss.64(l) and ss.64(7) of
the ALRA for land council administrative costs. Land councils are required to
table their annual reports in the Commonwealth Parliament. The 30 per cent of
funds disbursed via the land councils to organisations in 'areas affected1 has
proved to display a weakness in accountability due to flaws in the legislation.
These moneys are, arguably, regarded as direct compensation for the negative
impacts of resource development projects. The remaining 30 per cent held in the
ABR (for investment, grants and its own expenditure) have a high degree of formal
accountability owing to the administration of these moneys by ATSIC and strict
reporting requirements as a Commonwealth agency.
These differences raise many ambiguities, particularly given that the
original source of funding is the CRF. If the moneys are indeed compensatory, and
private in nature, why should they be used to fund land councils which are
Commonwealth statutory authorities? Conversely, if the nature of the moneys are
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public why are the 'areas affected' moneys not as highly accountable as the
administrative moneys of the land councils?
Who should administer the fund ?
In the 1984 review of the ABTA it was recognised by all members of the
working party that, as a long-term objective, complete Aboriginal control of the
ABTA is desirable (Altman 1985: 13). While the ATSIC (1998) submission to this
review acknowledges and supports this position, there has been no further critical
assessment of such a position since the time of the 1984review. The ABR is
essentially managed and controlled by officers of ATSIC. The Advisory Committee
has little input into the investment strategies or the day-to-day operations of the
reserve.
ATSIC
The ABR Secretariat is currently a section of the NT State Office of ATSIC.
Staff salaries, related expenses and running costs have historically been met by
ATSIC and its predecessor DAA. Its approach to management of the ABRhas been
conservative. ATSIC staff exercise a range of substantive delegations for the
Minister.
Both the Northern Land Council (NLC) and Central Land Council (CLC)
commented, in their respective submissions to the review, that the management
of the ABR by Commonwealth government officers has always been problematic.
It is noted that ATSIC, and the DAA before it, are not neutral agencies, and their
respective agendas are not necessarily consistent with those of the land councils
and their Aboriginal constituents or the Advisory Committee. Indeed, ATSIC and
DAA have/had a nation-wide, rather than a specific NT,agenda. Furthermore, the
staffing and resourcing of the ABR is subject to government-initiated cuts to the
public service generally, or specific cuts to ATSIC, unless the ABR is funded
through ss.64(5). The current political climate also suggests that the certainty of
the continuation of ATSIC either as an organisation, or in its current
administrative role, cannot be guaranteed.
The land councils
Under the original Woodward model it was intended that land council
administrative costs and distributions to royalty associations were to be paid
directly to land councils from MRE revenue raised on Aboriginal land (that is 70
per cent of MREs). The ABTA was to receive only 30 per cent of MREs for grant
functions pursuant to ss.64(4). However, with the drafting and the enactment of
the legislation, the ABTA became the initial recipient of all MREs and charged
with the role of distribution of MREs to the land councils.
While the land councils are funded by MREs, a regime initially established
to protect them from the discretion of government budgetary decisions, policy
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decisions taken by Ministers, ATSIC and its predecessor, in curtailing land
council expenditure demonstrate that land councils have similar 'government'
style constraints in which they operate. Furthermore, as MREs are a commodity
based revenue which fluctuates, year to year funding can vary. Given the current
political environment and financial constraints, the enhancement of land council
functions and the further allocation of resources to undertake those functions is
unlikely to be supported.
Independent board
The ABR consists of a small secretariat and an Advisory Committee. The
primary, and almost solitary role, of the Advisory Committee is to recommend to
the Minister, or Minister's delegate, projects and expenditure relating to the
making of grants to, or for, the benefit of Aboriginal people in the NT pursuant to
ss.64(4) oftheALRA.
The Advisory Committee currently consists of 15 members. A chairperson is
appointed by the Minister while the remaining 14 members are elected from the
membership of the four NT land councils. The Advisory Committee membership is
based loosely on a proportional population representation model. There are seven
members from the NLC region, five from the CLC region, and one each from the
Tiwi Land Council (TLC)region and the Anindilyakwa Land Council (ALC) region.
The composition, both in terms of total membership, representation and terms of
office are policy decisions as the ALRA does not specify these provisions. The
practice has been that the Minister approves terms of office of three years and
land council nominees are selected through the land council election process.
The Advisory Committee is expected to act impartially and objectively, while
at the same time being responsive to Aboriginal requirements and priorities. While
the Committee is meant to be an apolitical body, for Aboriginal people, control of
resources (particularly in the contemporary context, cash) is synonymous with
politics. Altaian (1985: 98) noted that it was of concern to members of the ABTA
Working Party that under the current system, Advisory Committee members were
under continuous pressure to approve grants for their local areas and often held
personally responsible by their regional base when applications were rejected. The
solution to this complex situation is not to relieve Aboriginal people of decision
making powers, but rather to set up systems that offer Aboriginal people who are
expected to make fair and impartial decisions, reasonable safeguards against
direct regional or family pressure and coercion.
In conjunction with this is the need to clearly establish a mission statement
for the ABR, and to ensure that such a mission statement receives consensus
within the NT Aboriginal community. The prospect of an independent board
elected by all NTAboriginal people would go some way to addressing these issues.
Its membership, representativeness, processes and management would be
determined by the ABR's mission statement. If the ABR were to be investment
orientated then issues of contestabiliry and the inclusion of outside, possibly non-
indigenous, expert participation, needs to be considered.
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One important issue is how members of an independent board are selected.
Currently the process for nomination to the Advisory Committee is undertaken by
the land councils. Alternatively, selection could be undertaken by a separate NT-
wide election process but this is a very expensive process. Possibly, selection to
the ABR could coincide with ATSIC regional council elections. Another alternative
could be that each regional council nominate either its chairperson or another
councillor as a member of the ABRBoard.
Allocation of mining royalty equivalents
Under the current legislation the allocation of MREs is as follows:
1. Ss.64(l)—40 per cent of MREs is paid to land councils for administrative
expenses in proportions as determined by the Minister, having regard to the
number of Aboriginal people living in the area of each land council.
Table 1. Disbursements out of the ABR pursuant to ss.64(1)
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96
1996/97
Total
NLC
255,151
468,166
920,564
1,299.560
3.889,333
3.689.237
3.914,774
4.658.061
4,030,537
3,357,060
4,079,412
6,091,387
7.738.348
7,849,865
3,852,520
6,693,048
6,063.376
5.598.423
6,104.500
80.553.322
CLC
148.838
273.796
536.995
758.077
2.392,773
2,406,024
2.553,114
3.037.866
2.628.611
2,130,289
2,660,486
3,972,644
5,046,749
5,352,180
2,626.718
4.563,442
4,134,120
3.817.106
4,531.608
53,571,436
TLC
21,262
39,014
76,714
108,296
330,637
320,803
340,415
405.049
374.181
354,341
354,732
529,686
672,900
713,624
350.229
608,459
551,216
508.947
665,693
7,326,198
ALC
356,812
175,115
304,229
275,608
254,474
332,847
1.699.085
MWT
29,077
53.353
104.908
148,098
431.866
409,536
434,572
517,082
448,936
359.679
436,825
652,267
828,624
878,773
431,280
749.299
456,977
424,033
471,764
8,266.949
Total
454,328
834.329
1.639.181
2.314.031
7.044,609
6,825,600
7,242,875
8,618,058
7.482.265
6.201,369
7,531,455
11.245,984
14,286,621
15,151,254
7,435.862
12,918,477
11,481,297
10,602,983
12,106,412
151,416,990
Source: ABR
The current allocation to each land council for administrative costs as
determined by the Minister in accordance with ss.64(l) is:
NLC 22 per cent;
CLC 15 per cent;
TLC 2 per cent;
ALC 1 per cent.
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2. Ss.64(3)—30 per cent of MREs is disbursed from the ABR to the land
councils for distribution in accordance with ss.35(2) to Aboriginal councils
or incorporated bodies in the areas affected by mining operations.
Table 2. Disbursements out of the ABR pursuant to ss.64(3)
NLC CLC ALC MWT Total
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96
1996/97
Total
Source: ABR
318.939
585.208
1.150,705
1,624.450
4,959,558
4,812,048
4,896,726
5,205,456
5,130,734
4,705,871
4.056,417
6.671,445
8.323.126
2.676.714
2,203.913
4,234.611
3,881,226
3,473,975
4,205,686
73,116,808
1,079,776
481,986
609,248
,264,556
,273,842
,770.371
690.310
,026.958
,959.764
2,097,213
1,318.199
2,671,796
16,244,019
7.337.338
2.022,565
2,932,508
2.289.801
2.842.039
3,107,915
20,532,166
21,808
40,014
78,681
111.073
323,899
307,152
312.557
401.185
358.259
327.257
327,618
489,200
621,468
659,079
323,460
561,963
342,733
318,024
414,889
6.340,309
340,747
625.222
1,229,386
1,735,523
5.283,457
5.119.200
5.209.283
6.686.417
5.970.979
5.642,376
5.648,591
8,434,487
10,714,965
11,363,441
5,576,896
9,688,836
8.610.973
7.952,237
10.400.286
1 16.233.302
Table 3. Disbursements out of the ABR pursuant to ss.64(4) and 64(5)
Year
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96
1996/97
Total
Note: Above figures for years
are accrual based.
Source: ABR
s.64(4)
2,481,695
1,094.590
500,713
871.277
659,582
2,000.178
4,888,055
3.474,727
1,083,036
4,108,745
8,076,203
2,516,657
8,330,927
7,770,955
9,561,396
674,403
651,181
4,114,620
3,895,506
66,754,446
1978/79 to 1986/87 are cash figures.
S.64(5)
4,091
2,810
9,729
12,164
18,204
43.906
56.009
18.064
83.078
154,888
239,691
194,371
215,978
317,141
98,495
129,757
174,819
171,378
98,699
2,043,272
Figures for 1987/88 to 1996/97
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Table 4. Disbursements out of the ABR pursuant to ss.64(7)
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96
1996/97
Total
NLC
307.917
280,982
1,107.138
220.989
293,586
1,242.474
128,724
1.012,342
3,294,367
3,292,690
2,219,442
900,000
4,373,758
1,776.453
2.468.514
4,554.259
371,851
27.845,486
CLC
218,232
50,000
284.553
80.000
178,127
2,184.053
1,371,529
1,420,618
1,500.000
3,863.747
1.670,134
3.017.568
3.779.371
485,662
20.103.594
ALC MWT
33.674
22.631
97.461
20,580
98,046
73.298
303.394
54.767
116.602 124.952
69.779 474.299
153.701
35.318 163.399
304,272
223.976
221.699 2,148.450
Total
Nil
559,823
353.613
1.489,152
321.569
293,586
1 .340,520
128,724
1,263,767
5.781.814
4.664,219
3,694,827
Nil
2,641,554
8,781.583
3,600,288
5,684.799
8.637.902
1,081.489
50.319,229
Source: ABR.
3. Ss.64(4), 64(5) and 64(7)—30 per cent of MREs is to be utilised as follows:
• Ss.64(4)—to, or for, the benefit of Aboriginal people living in the NT. This
has been facilitated by application-driven grant funding.
• Ss.64(5)—for administrative costs of the ABRSecretariat.
• Ss.64(7)—allows for supplementary funding for land council
administrative costs where ss.64(l) distributions are insufficient.
40/30/30
The allocation of MREs to land councils, areas affected and to grants to, or
for, the benefit of Aboriginal people of the NT was initially arrived at arbitrarily. As
Woodward commented 'in the final analysis an arbitrary decision has to be made
and tested in practice to see how it works'. Woodward stated that this matter
must be reviewed by the Government on request from the land councils from time
to time, in the light of the amounts of money involved and the respective needs of
land councils, local communities and other communities (Woodward 1974: 113).
Woodward recommended that all royalty payments be paid over by the
government to the regional land council for distribution as follows:
• four-tenths to be retained by the land councils;
• three-tenths to be paid to the local community;and
• three-tenths to be paid to the ABTA (Woodward 1974: 114).
Woodward's 40/30/30 formula was never fully adopted in the ALRA. While
ss.64(l) stipulates that 40 per cent of royalties be paid to land councils to finance
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their Ministerially-approved budgets, and ss.64(3) states that 30 per cent of MRE
receipts of the ABTA will be paid to land councils for distribution to incorporated
bodies in the areas affected by mining, ss.64(4) does not guarantee that the full
remaining 30 per cent of the ABTA receipts will be distributed Territory-wide. The
most significant departure from Woodward's 40/30/30 formula occurred in 1979
when, by an amendment act, ss.64(7) was included in the ALRA (Altman1985:
64). This amendment allowed the Minister to direct supplementary MREs, from
the residual 30 per cent held in the ABR, to land councils when the 40 per cent of
MREs did not meet the cost of their proposed administrative expenditure for a
particular year.
In fact under the FMS, implemented by the previous Labor Minister
(Tickner) and continued by the current Liberal Minister, approval of grants
pursuant to ss.64(4) is limited to $5 million per annum. Furthermore, the
inclusion of ss.64(5) in the ALRA provided that moneys, originally intended
specifically by Woodward for grants, could also be used to meet the administrative
expenses of administering the ABTA. Notably, there has been only a very minor
draw by the ABR for its administrative expenses (at the most O.Sper cent of its
income over time). However, there has been substantial drawing on the fund by
the land councils for supplementary funds under ss.(7). Some $50,319,229 (gross
including MWT) has been approved as supplementary administrative moneys for
the land councils. The net result is that the ratio of disbursements from the ABR
over time is actually 52.5 per cent to the land councils, 30 per cent as areas
affected moneys and only 17.5per cent in grants to, or for, the benefit of
Aboriginal people in the NT.
Toohey (1984: 109) noted in his report that the matter of distributing
moneys from the ABTA in a way less arbitrary and more equitable than at present
was not an easy one to resolve. Putting aside the question of whether 40 per cent
is adequate for the administrative costs of land councils, the division of the
remaining 60 per cent needs to be objectively considered. Toohey noted that one
approach would be to amend ss.64(3) and reduce the percentage from 30 to 10,
thereby leaving 50 per cent for distribution for the benefit of Aboriginals living in
the NT. In effect, this would have been a regressive policy as there was a 10 per
cent allocation to areas affected by mining under the pre-land rights regime.
Another option noted by Toohey would be to discard the notion of percentages
and empower the Advisory Committee to determine, from year to year, the
distribution of moneys paid out of the ABTA (Toohey 1984:109).
While Toohey favoured a reduction in the percentage distribution under
ss.64(3) to ensure a more equitable distribution to Aboriginal people in the NT
and to broaden the range of beneficiaries of MREs, he was very conscious of the
impact on those associations already receiving areas affected moneys. Some
associations had established projects, including commercial enterprises, which
anticipate receipt of 30 per cent of MREs for at least the life of the mine. The same
issues remain salient today. Organisations such as Gagudju have invested heavily
in the regional economy. Indeed, the current financial problems faced by Gagudju
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demonstrate the organisation's reliance on MREs to maintain its investments and
its broader commitments to social program objectives.
Therefore, any alteration to the current allocative formula might have
drastic results for royalty associations. If changes were to be made, it is
imperative that the existing financial obligations of royalty associations are not
overlooked. It would be necessary to examine the potential for other sources of
funding to ensure the continued viability of these operations.
Ultimately, Toohey suggested that the status quo be maintained but also
suggested that the formula be reviewed in about two years time. In 1984, the
ABTA Working Party examined the question, although it was not within its terms
of reference. The Working Party endorsed Justice Toohey's recommendation for a
review of the formula and at the same time canvassed possible options. These
included:
• The pooling of all moneys raised under ss.64(3) from which incorporated
bodies could apply for funds for projects that diminish the impact of the
disturbance of mining, thereby explicitly recognising a role of areas affected
moneys.
• That all ss.64(3) moneys be paid to a 'new' ABTA, in actual effect
discounting the regional compensatory nature of the payments. The existing
royalty associations would have the same access to grants as other
Aboriginal groups. Compensation payments would be paid by the mining
company pursuant to s.43 and s.44 (Altman 1985: 246).
The Working Party eventually adopted the position that the original
Woodward model should be strictly implemented. It took the view that the ABTA
was intended to be a clearing house. The Working Party recommended the repeal
of ss.64(7) and 64(5) and an amendment to ss.64(4) to guarantee that at least 30
per cent of MREs be paid to a proposed restructured ABTA to ensure it met the
original intent of the grant function (Altman 1985:248).
There have been two significant developments since these reviews were
undertaken which arguably need consideration in determining an allocation
formula. The first is recognition of native title and the possibility that
compensation payments from mining disturbance may accrue to Aboriginal native
title holders (NTH) and claimants in the NT. Notably, these payments are explicitly
compensation and in all probability would be paid direct to a prescribed body
corporate, the membership of which will be solely NTHs. This is a comparable
regime to the negotiated agreement moneys under the ALRA except that in the
case of the ALRA such payments are made to the land council for distribution to
the traditional owners or as specified in the agreement. However, under the broad
allocative model of the ALRA benefits can accrue to Aboriginal people, in the form
of grants, without any proximity to the area affected by mining. In effect, a NTH
can be a beneficiary, by way of a grant pursuant to ss.64(4) of the ALRA, from
mining moneys derived some distance from their land and at the same time be a
beneficiary of the native title compensation regime in respect to their specific
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land. Of course, under the Native Title Act no statutory MREs are guaranteed to
NTHs affected by mining (Altman and Pollack 1998). This is a particularly
complex issue to resolve in terms of equity and balance in the NT.
The second development is the sunset clause, which came into effect on 5
June 1997 and will impact on the operations of the CLCand NLC in the future. At
31 October 1997there remained some 113 land claims requiring resolution
(Reeves 1997:1) but no further claims can be lodged. This does not imply any
reduction in workload and function of those land councils which pursue land
claims (namely the NLC and CLC) at this stage. However, it would appear
inevitable that in the medium to long term this function will become redundant
under the ALRA. Having said that, this review provides an opportunity to reassess
the direction of all the land councils in the post-sunset clause era. The prospect of
the land councils not needing to commit money for research, administration and
legal services involved with land claims in the future poses the prospect that
resources could be directed increasingly to economic and land development
strategies. Furthermore, the prospect arises of the diminution of the draw on the
resources of the ABR.
Conceivably, it is possible that new strategies could be put in place now.
One option would be to fund the NLC and CLC either by grant or by specific
payment from the CRF for their respective land claim programs, separate to
existing funding. This funding arrangement would be limited to the time frame
necessary to complete the land claim process. There is a precedent for such direct
funding where the NLCand CLC are funded as Native Title Representative Bodies
by grant from ATSIC. There are prospects of achieving economies of scale due to
the overlap of some land claims and native title claims in some locations. The
benefits to the land councils include the opportunity to concentrate the resources
of the remainder of the organisation, which would be funded from the current
stream of MREs, towards its other existing functions while also enhancing their
land management and development activities.
Land councils/investment/community facilities/grants
As noted 70 per cent of MREs are fixed for disbursement to land councils for
administrative purposes (40 per cent) and for further disbursement to areas
affected (30 per cent). While the ALRA specifies usage by the land councils for
administrative purposes, it is silent in respect to areas affected. Under ss.64(4)
the Act specifies that of the remaining 30 per cent, the Minister may approve
grants to, or for, the benefit of Aboriginal people in the NT. The interpretation of
'to, or for, the benefit' can be very wide and the ALRA does not specify any generic
use of these moneys.
The application of areas affected moneys is addressed in Part II in respect to
royalty associations. As outlined there, these moneys have been applied to a mix
of community services and infrastructure, investments and commercial
enterprises and, sometimes, individual cash payments. Grants from the ABR are
historically of a capital, rather than recurrent, nature and have been directed to a
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range of economic, social and cultural projects including some infrastructure and
enterprises. Of the number of grants made, vehicles and boats feature
predominantly. The practice of utilising MRE moneys for community services and
facilities is problematic. This matter is dealt with under the heading of
substitution.
Since the enactment of the legislation the primary focus of the NLCand CLC
has been to claim land. The land councils have been very successful in expanding
the Aboriginal land 'estate' of the NT. The ABR has been party to this expansion
by purchasing pastoral leases which are later lodged for claim under the ALRA. It
has been argued, from a management perspective, that the Aboriginal land 'estate'
should not expand beyond the capacity of resources to manage and develop that
land. The post-sunset clause era provides the opportunity to reassess the
management needs and development potential of the 'estate'. In this respect,
consideration needs to be given to the role the ABRcan play in land management
and development and the potential for a strategic alliance with the Indigenous
Land Corporation (ILC).
Income source
The ABR's current revenue source is limited to receipts of MREs from CRF,
although it accrues some relatively minor revenue from investment, and ATSIC
funds its operation costs. The ABR has been unable to generate significant
income from investment due to its predominant role as a clearing house and
rarely has the capital available to accumulate significant investment revenue.
Mining royalties
The role of mining royalties was central to Woodward's scenario, for he
realised the need for funds independent of annual budget appropriations. The
historical precedent dating back to 1952 existed whereby the Commonwealth
surrendered its royalty receipts in favour of Aborigines (Altman 1983: 3-8).
Under the current arrangements the Commonwealth has a continuing
obligation to pay into the ABR amounts equivalent to those which it receives by
way of mining royalties derived specifically from uranium' and also equivalents of
royalties received by the NT Government, which do not go into the CRF.
Essentially the arrangement is premised on the recommendations ofWoodward
that minerals and petroleum on Aboriginal land should remain the property of the
Crown, but nevertheless Aboriginal people should be 'compensated' with these
payments to address the negative impacts of mining on their lives. By the end of
the 1997/98 financial year more than $400 million will have been paid out of the
CRF to the ABRunder this arrangement.
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Other possible sources
The Crough Review {Crough 1989) raised the possibility that the ABTA, or
the Aboriginal organisations receiving income through the ABTA, might be funded
on a basis other than that of MREs. It was suggested that it might be possible to
link the ABTA's income to other forms of taxation raised from activities of (mining
and non-mining)companies on Aboriginal land.
A further option would be to aggregate all revenue derived from mining or
development on Aboriginal land in the NT within the ABR. This would increase
the capital basis of the ABR and potentially generate additional investment
income. No doubt this is a contentious option given the 'private' nature of these
moneys, and traditional owners would need an inducement for it to occur. Such
an inducement may be a dollar for dollar expenditure on community projects in
their area.
The aggregation to the ABR could also include gate takings and other
related income from Parks. Moneys released from the ABR would be directed to
projects in the area from where the moneys were derived. Consideration could
also be given to aggregating income from native title land within the ABR. This,
however, would be politically and legally difficult to achieve.
It should be noted that, in aggregating these revenues, significant
administration and other resources could be expended. The potential exists for
such expenses to offset a significant proportion, if not all, of the benefits of the
additional investment returns.
Rather than seek additional revenue one of the more obvious methods to
increase the income of the ABR would be to enhance its investment activities with
a mixture of expenditure control and deregulation of investment constraints. The
FMS goes part way in facilitating expenditure control. Those identified constraints
under Commonwealth financial legislation and regulation could be loosened or
amendments passed to exempt the ABRso it could participate in a wider range of
investments. The abolition of MWT would also assist with strengthening the
development potential of the ABR. A reduction in the ABR's grants activities
would also provide the basis for increased capital accumulation.
The possibility of receiving funds from the ILC could also be examined if the
ABR were to adopt a land management oriented focus. An agreement could be
negotiated whereby the ABR was provided with a NT-wide allocation to address
land management projects together with its own resources. This would probably
be a dollar for dollar arrangement between the ABRand the ILC.
Investment
The ABR 1996/97 annual report notes that moneys which are surplus to
immediate requirements are either placed on deposit or invested. The Secretariat
has an investment strategy which attempts to maximise investment returns,
within its legislative constraints, whilst meeting liquidity requirements.
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Investments are concentrated in the 'official money market' where funds are
mainly invested in Bank Accepted Bills of Exchange and interest bearing deposits
and the 1 lam Call Market.
The investment strategies of the ABR have been criticised by the land
councils and others. Altman (1996b: 7) observed that accumulated reserves
totalling $31.5 million (in nominal terms) at 30 June 1996 represented only 8 per
cent of the ABTA's overall income. The CLC (1997) noted that less than 10 per
cent of ABTA revenue is generated by investment. Some have argued that in order
to advance the investment potential of the ABRit should become autonomous and
free from the many legislative constraints in which it currently operates. The NT
Chief Minister suggested that the ABR should be established as a statutory
authority with a commercial orientation. Altman (1996b) suggested the
establishment of a NT Commercial Development Corporation with a goal of
enhancing economic development for indigenous people on Aboriginal land.
In response to these suggestions, it should be noted that the legislation does
not require the ABR to save. The CLC (1997) re-emphasises that the role of the
ABR is to provide compensation for Aboriginal bodies in the NT and not to
generate revenue. The position expressed is that the exposure of ABR moneys to
market risk is unacceptable. Risk taking with moneys that represent
compensation for those largely in low income brackets has been considered
unacceptable by the ABR Secretariat and the land councils, regardless of the
safeguards of the constraints imposed by the Audit Act.
It has also been suggested that the ABRcould adopt improved measures to
increase revenue into the fund even within the constraints of the existing
Commonwealth financial regime. It is asserted that under both the old and new
Commonwealth financial regime there is scope for alternative avenues for
investment which the ABR has failed to pursue. However, the relevance of such
arguments are unclear as they are based substantively on particular sections of
the legislation which may not apply to the ABR.With these range of views it would
appear necessary to clarify exactly what the ABR can legally invest in, but more
importantly to determine its actual charter and the purpose of any expanded
investment role.
The charter
Critical to the evolution of a 'charter' for the ABR is the consensus from all
stakeholders. There would appear to be four options:
ABR as a clearing house (status quo): If the ABR is to remain primarily a
clearing house then perhaps its current functions are adequate or require
marginal improvement with some minor amendments to the legislation.
ABR as an investment house: If the ABR is to become a mechanism for
capital accumulation with a long-term goal of self-sufficiency and expansion, for
the benefit of Aboriginal people in the NT, a major overhaul of its focus and
operations is required. It would be necessary to assert a new direction of land
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rights in the NTwith a greater focus on economic development. Ultimately, from
this position, a new institution would be required with suitable flexibility to invest
in large wealth-creating projects.
ABR as a development corporation: This is basically a composite of the two
above and would entail many of the aspects of an investment house, but with less
risk. The onus would be on improved financial management with existing
resources rather than seeking increased revenue from investment. The focus of
operations would be towards the development of Aboriginal land and related
commercial activities. ,
ABR as a sociocultural corporation: The mission being the maintenance of
indigenous culture and society. The orientation would be towards land
management and development. Projects, funded jointly with other government
agencies, would focus on employment creation as well as specific allocations to
linguistic, ceremonial and cultural ventures.
Commercial advice
Under its current operations and legislative safeguards, as a clearing house
and small investor the ABR arguably provides adequate commercial advice.
However, with a reorientation towards major investment and financial objectives,
outside commercial and investment expertise of the highest quality would seem
imperative.
Such independent expertise would be required not only to ensure
professional commercial advice, but to introduce contestability in the decision-
making process and buffer the Board from regional and local politicking.
Expertise and advice could be accessed by including Ministerially appointed
experts to the Board (like the ILC), employing staff with the relevant skills and
qualifications in a restructured ABR, or by seeking advice from consultants.
Indigenous BusinessAustralia
The proposed Indigenous Business Australia (IBA) intends to aggregate
most, if not all. Commonwealth Aboriginal investment funds in order to benefit
from higher rates of return and lead to enhanced revenue for all participating
funds. The inhibiting factors to this proposal are dealt with broadly under
s.3.4.6.4. Notably, the IBA limits its aggregation only to Commonwealth funds.
Revenue raised under State legislation such as the New South Wales Aboriginal
Land Rights Act or Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act, is not included. The question
needs to be raised as to why only revenue raised in the NT is to be included. This
is particularly relevant in the context of the prospect of Statehood or patriation of
the administration of the legislation to the NT.
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Cooperation with other indigenous investment funds
There are a number of factors which inhibit the prospect of active
cooperation with other indigenous investment funds. The ALRA itself is unique
and unusual in the Australian context. The institutions created by the ALRA are
unique, particularly the ABR. Notably, the contextual relationship between non-
indigenous and indigenous people is very different to the rest of Australia, as 27
per cent of the total NT population is indigenous. Furthermore one of the more
significant outcomes of the ALRA is that almost 50 per cent of the land mass of
the NTis held, or will be, by Aboriginal land trusts.
A further consideration is the explicit orientation of the ALRA towards
benefiting specifically the Aboriginal people of the NT. The combination of these
factors, and notably the perception of the resistance of the stakeholders in the
ABR, suggest that any integration with other investment funds will be seen as
loss of control of resources. Furthermore, any potential support of the NT
Government, either politically or economically, is linked to the good sense of
maintaining all of the ABR's activities within the NT.
Distribution of funds
As already outlined, the distribution of funds is predicated on the 40/30/30
formula but,based on the assessment of distributions from the ABR since its
creation, the net result of those distributions is 52.5/30/17.5.
Questions of how distributions are undertaken, and to which entity, will
ultimately be determined in the context of any changes to the current regime. The
options include:
• maintaining the status quo;
• Woodward's model—whereby 30 per cent is guaranteed under the legislation
in ss.64(4);
• funding land councils from CRF direct with all MREs going to the ABRfor
grants and areas affected either on a 50/50 or other proportions to be
decided;
• a revised formula which would perhaps reduce or enhance the proportion of
distribution to areas affected; and
• establishing a regime without a formula where the Board of the ABR
determines allocations annually with some guarantees for land councils.
Policy guidelines
The ABR has produced policy guidelines for the purposes of grant funding
and administration, and financial distributions to the land councils. These policy
guidelines are reviewed from time to time and as the need arises. In the main the
policy guidelines are formulated by the ABR Secretariat sometimes with
assistance from the Native Title and Land Rights Branch in ATSIC's Central
C E N T R E F O R A B O R I G I N A L E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 168 17
Office; policy guidelines in respect to grant funding and administration are
formulated with the assistance of the ABR Sub-Committee. As the ABR is part of
ATSIC, Commonwealth financial regulations and guidelines apply.
As already noted, the FMS has been successful in its goal to arrest the
decline in the reserve. It is due for review during 1997/98.2 A set of guidelines
described as a 'New Funding Regime for land councils' were implemented on 1
July 1996 to specifically address those land councils which required
supplementary funds under ss.64(7). These guidelines were introduced to address
several issues. As moneys are now released from the ABR on a quarterly basis,
land councils drawing on ss.64(7) moneys are required to report their financial
position on a quarterly basis. Therefore, the need for ss.64(7) moneys is under
quarterly review. A benefit of this new regime to the land councils is that funds
are guaranteed to be released in the first week of each quarter. In the past land
councils have been required to take overdrafts with associated costs at the
beginning of each financial year to cover the period before they were in receipt of
the first MRE distributions of the year.
While this paper does not incorporate an extensive review of the ABR's
policies guidelines, in the main these guidelines appear to be operating
satisfactorily and achieving the required goals in the context of the current
regime. Although there are some inadequacies in guidelines to address the
assessment of the performance of grants. It would be inevitable with the
implementation of any recommendations from this review that the policy
guidelines of the ABR might become either redundant or require review.
Administration of the distribution
In terms of past performance in accountability and transparency, the ABRis
arguably the preferred institution within the ALRA framework to administer the
distribution. However, the question needs to be examined if the ABR were to
adopt an enhanced role of investment and commercial activity, as to whether it
would want to undertake the role as clearing house as well.
In this context, the original Woodward model could apply; MREs could be
paid direct to the land councils for their administrative expenses and for further
distribution to areas affected. As an alternative, areas affected moneys could be
distributed direct from the ABR rather than the land council. This alternative
could include provisions for a proportion of the areas affected moneys to be
withheld by the ABR for investment on behalf of the royalty association. The ABR
would become the accountability point for the royalty association, while the land
council would adopt a mentoring role with each royalty association.
Transparency in the distribution
Due to the application of Commonwealth financial management and
auditing requirements, the distribution of funds in and out of the ABR is highly
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transparent. The ABR is now required to produce annual reports which document
the source of revenue and income, and clearly record the disbursements to the
relevant institutions and organisation pursuant to ss.64(1),(3),(4) and (7).
The land councils, who are now caught under an identical accountability
regime as that of the ABR, also provide a high level of transparency in the level of
financial disbursements. However, it is not always easy to identify the specific
category of payments made to royalty associations in the land council annual
reports. Although the land councils specify their determinations under ss.35, in
some instances the land councils records only composite payments to royalty
associations. This presents further problems in attempting to identify in the
royalty association's financial statements the type and category of payments
received.
It would be beneficial, in light of the need for transparency of distributions,
for the financial statements of the land councils (in respect to disbursements) and
royalty associations (in respect to income) to specify the type, category and
specific section of the ALRA from which moneys are derived.
Targeting benefits to Aboriginal communities
It has been the practice of the ABRthat applications for grants pursuant to
ss.64(4) are assessed initially by ATSIC regional office staff. This practice has
been adopted to avoid duplication of grant allocations and it is reasonable to
expect officers in the region to have a better knowledge of the applicant and past
performance as a grant recipient. Furthermore, regional office staff have a closer
relationship with ATSIC regional councils and would be familiar with the priorities
set in regional plans and community plans. While the ABRalso liaises with other
Commonwealth and NT agencies which provide assistance for Aboriginal people,
the focus has been at the regional level rather than NT-wide.
A departure from this practice would be dependent on the ABR being given
a new charter. Nevertheless, mechanisms already exist for improved targeting of
benefits to Aboriginal communities which perhaps have not been fully explored
and integrated with ABR processes. For example, the intent of regional plans and
community plans is to produce consultative and negotiated plans that address
the needs and priorities of Aboriginal communities, and attempt to evaluate
potential resources. These documents are potentially instructive not only in
assisting to determine community project priorities but also in interpreting the
expectations of institutions. In this regard, it would be useful, if not necessary, for
the ABRAdvisory Committee and the Sub-Committee to refer to regional plans in
policy deliberations.
As an alternative model, the composition of the ABR AdvisoryCommittee
could potentially be made up of representatives from ATSIC regional councils. As
the formulators of the regional plans, these representatives might have a better
approach to targeting benefits than the current land council nominees. However,
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if the ABR were to have a land management and development focus, land council
nominees would arguably be better qualified.
Accountability of recipients of grants
As grants from the ABR are predominantly of a capital, rather than a
recurrent, nature, the practice has been adopted that the ABRpays the provider
directly on invoice rather than via the grant recipient. Essentially, accountability
procedures cease at this point. ATSIC-style acquittal processes are not applied as
the usage and the application of the grant funds are qualified at the point of
transaction.
However, there has been a lack of assessment of the performance of the
grants. This was an area of constant criticism by auditors in the late 1980s, as
was the failure of the then ABTA to create performance indicators. Only one
review has been undertaken specifically focused on assessing the performance of
the grants, which was in 1990/91. This review examined a cross-section
(approximately 25 per cent of the total and covered all regions) of the grants made
since the establishment of the ABTA. It attempted to evaluate the benefits accrued
by particular types of generic grants and recommended a format for performance
indicators. The implementation of the recommendations of the review were put on
hold following the moratorium on the ABTA's grant functions in the following
years. An assessment of the ABTA's annual reports since 1990/91 reveals no
record of the use of any performance indicators.
Substitution
In submissions to this review the large land councils have maintained the
view that MREs are compensatory. The land councils (CLC 1997: 111; NLC 1997:
121) expressed the following view that such funds are compensatory in nature
and are not intended to substitute for unsatisfactory government expenditure for
Aboriginal development. The land councils argued that ABTA funds reflect:
• a special right to compensation for traditional owners of land directly
affected by mining operations;
• a wider entitlement to compensation for loss of land or connected rights and
associated disadvantage to Aboriginal people throughout the NT; and
• the need to provide land councils and Aboriginal bodies providing
representation, advice and additional services or assistance with financial
support that is insulated from political party machinations and the
immediate control of government.
A number of reports (see, for example, the Kakadu Region Social Impact
Study (KRSIS) 1997) have suggested that MREs and other mining payments have
been utilised to substitute normal government funding for community
infrastructure and other projects. These observations are largely based on
anecdote rather than on substantive research. It is argued that, as a net result of
C E N T R E F O R A B O R I G I N A L E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H
20 ALTMAN AND POLLACK
substitution, Aboriginal groups in receipt of mining moneys utilise those moneys
for social welfare and services, and therefore do not accrue the benefits from a
development. In effect, what are initially perceived as compensation moneys due
to disturbance by mining, eventually offset legitimate government expenditure.
As noted in the KRSIS (1997: 34) services, housing and infrastructure come
from a limited pool of government resources. Many agencies apply tests for
allocations based on need. In simple terms, money or services go proportionally to
where the need is greatest or where people are poorest. This practice is widely
accepted as appropriate and was acknowledged as appropriate by the KRSIS
Advisory Group. However, with either actuality or perception of income and
facilities from mining and tourism, areas that receive moneys from mining, such
as the Kakadu Region, may slip down the priority list. While this may or may not
occur in other areas where moneys are derived from development on Aboriginal
land, it is a likely outcome given the criteria regional councils and other agencies
apply.
The perceived phenomenon of substitution would appear to be regionally or
locally based. There does not appear to be any discounting of allocation of
government funds to the NT from national allocative regimes. The NT was
allocated $160 million by ATSIC in 1996/97, which is the second highest
allocation of all State and Territory allocations (Western Australia being the
highest with $190 million). In order to gauge the extent of substitution it would be
appropriate to inquire with ATSIC Regional Councils and the NT Government as
to whether there exist implicit or explicit policies and practices which divert
resources away from Aboriginal groups who are in receipt of MREs.
At the same time, consultations could ensue to encourage joint-funding
arrangements between agencies and associations receiving mining royalty
equivalents. Joint-funding arrangements would ensure that government agencies
participate in the development process in those communities which have,
arguably, been neglected in the past due to the perception they have adequate
resources to address the problems they face.
Mining Withholding Tax (MWT)
Historically, the receipts of the Aborigines Benefits Trust Fund (ABTF)
from 1966when it first received mining royalties, to 1978 when it was superseded
by the ABTA, were untaxed. Similarly, investment and interest income accrued by
the ABTF were regarded as non-taxable income. When the ABTA became
operational on 1 July 1978,its receipts were also untaxed. However, amendments
to the Commonwealth tax legislation in 1979 made MREs taxable income. In June
1979, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 was amended to include special
provisions for taxation of payments made in respect of mining operations on
Aboriginal land. The rate of taxation was originally specified in the Income Tax
(Mining Withholding Tax) Act 1979 as 6.4 per cent. This rate was calculated
according to explanatory memorandum at the rate of 32 per cent applied to 20
per cent of gross revenues concerned. In effect, though the tax is levied at the rate
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of 20 per cent of the minimum tax rate on all mining payments (Altaian 1985:
229-230).
The MWT is a final tax and later distributions do not attract further tax
liability when in the hands of Aboriginal recipients. MWT is payable on
distributions of MREs from the ABR. The formal liability for the tax rests on the
Aboriginal recipients of the mining payments while the responsibility of payment
rests with the ABR.
The current rate of MWT is 4 per cent; however, it has been reduced at
various times since it was first levied. Initially set at 6.4 per cent, it declined to 6
per cent (November 1982), to 5.8 per cent (November 1984) and to 4 per cent
(November 1994) (ATSIC 1997: 1). The most recent reduction occurred following
the efficiency audit of the NLC by the ANAO which recommended the MWT be
reviewed (Auditor-General 1993/94).
Financial information provided by the ABR indicates that since MWTwas
first levied on the ABTA the following amounts have been paid to the Australian
Taxation Office (ATO):
• $8,266,949 levied against ss.64(l);
• $2,148,450 levied against ss.64(7); and
• $6,340,309 levied against ss.64(3).
MWT is also levied against outgoings from the ABR in respect to grants
pursuant to ss.64(4). While the total MWT levied since the introduction of the tax
is difficult to quantify in respect to ss.64(4) the amounts levied during the years
1990/91 to 1993/94 indicate the variation from year to year. In 1990/91 an
amount of $164,790 was levied; 1991/92 totalled $300,639; 1992/93 totalled
$436,613; and in 1993/94 totalled $23,460 (ABTA annual reports). These
variations can be explained by the fact that grant approvals and release of funds
do not necessarily take place in the same financial year.
MWT is not levied against ss.64(5) as it has been the practice of the ABRto
derive its administrative expenses from non-taxable funds (that is, interest
earnings and minor receipts).
An assessment of the effectiveness of this tax concession to meet its
objectives has not been rigorously undertaken. The tax has been extremely
effective in taxing mining payments made out of the ABR. However, compliance
with respect to other mining payments made in the NT and on Aboriginal land in
the States is unclear. For example, the ATO estimates that it collected $1.1
million in MWT in 1995/96, 92 per cent of which was paid by the then ABTA
(ATSIC 1997: 1). The MWT framework, and ATO practice, do not clearly
distinguish the taxing of MREs (that are paid from CRF to the ABR and are totally
transparent) from payments from mining companies to Aboriginal interests that
are also liable to MWT. With respect to the objectives of the tax:
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• It is unclear if the MWT adds certainty in negotiating exploration and
mining agreements given that most are influenced by many unknown
variables like the future price of minerals and mine profitability;
• It is unclear if the MWT is well targeted being a blanket tax; and
• The incorporation of indigenous people into the Australian taxation system
has increased significantly in the 18 years since the introduction of the
concession (ATSIC 1997: 2).
Previous reviews of the ABTA (Altman 1985; Crough 1989) have found that
the MWT is unfair. It exacerbates funding problems of land councils and
enhances the perception of poor performance of the ABR as payments are always
referred to as gross rather than net. The 1989 review found the MWT
'discriminatory' and an 'unnecessary and inequitable impost' (Crough 1989: 44,
46). The working party of the 1984 review was 'unanimous in its belief that the
levying of mining withholding taxes on mining royalty equivalents was not only
inequitous, but also increased the funding difficulties experienced by Aboriginal
land councils and hampered the effective granting operations of the ABTA under
sub-s.64(4)' (Altman 1985: 229).
Recommendations/options
The ABRis a unique institution that is perceived as operating suboptimally
owing to a lack of an institutional vision and mission. It is important that this
issue is addressed and that a clear role, or amalgam of roles, for the ABR is
created.
The options include:
• Maintaining the status quo—the ABR as a clearing house with a minor role
as a reserve. This includes the need to enhance accountability requirements
of the royalty associations and the establishment of performance
assessment criteria for grants.
• An investment house—set an investment goal (e.g. self-sufficiency) and
identify the purpose and type of assistance to, or for, the benefit of
Aboriginal people in the NT (economicdevelopment).
• A development corporation—set a vision with a focus on the development of
Aboriginal land with a commercial orientation.
• A socio-cultural corporation—set a vision with the primary objective as the
maintenance of indigenous culture and society and a complimentary focus
on employment creation.
These options must be addressed immediately, partly because of the need to
reach consensus from all the affected parties. We recommend the establishment
of a working party with representatives from the land councils, ABR, NT
Government, and commerce to address this issue. Conceivably ATSIC would
establish the working party.
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Issues of governance, proportional division of receipts, and the future of the
ABR on statehood will need to be resolved. There is also the need to address the
lack of a clear charter for ABR which has resulted in lack of accountability for
performance because performance indicators are not strictly defined.
As a first step to reform we recommend:
• That a rigorous assessment of the implications of the new Commonwealth
auditing regime be undertaken in order to gauge its full impact upon the
institutions created by the ALRA;
• That the point at which MREs change from public moneys to become private
moneys is investigated;
• That mechanisms are instituted to ensure MREs are not used solely as
substitution funding;
• That the equity and efficiency implications of the MWT are again
investigated (if individual cash payments made by some royalty associations
cease then MWT logic is defeated);
• That an appropriate governance structure for the ABRfor the 21st century
is considered to ensure that the fiscal base of the ABRis enhanced.
In order that the basis be laid for the potential transformation and
orientation of the ABR,we recommend the following interim measures:
• That land council budgets are limited to 40 per cent of total MREs;
• Ss.64(3) payments remain at 30 per cent but with enhanced accountability
and better definition of use to which moneys should be applied; and
• Ss.64(4) continue to be restricted to $5 million per annum but with the
proviso that ABRAdvisory Committee is encouraged to expand the reserves
of the ABR if possible.
Royalty associations
It should be noted at the outset that the term 'royalty association' is a euphemism
that is not entirely accurate. Because of differences in the historical periods when
associations were established, differences in mining agreements, and differences
in the land rights of Aborigines, there has been no development of a single royalty
association model (Altaian 1983: 134). Furthermore, the term has been applied in
some instances to include those associations established to receive only moneys
pursuant to ss.35(3) and 35(4) of the ALRA which are agreement and rental
moneys not MREs. It has also been suggested that organisations receiving
moneys pursuant to ss.35(l), which are surplus administrative moneys
distributed by the land councils, could nominally be described as 'royalty
associations'.
Such broad interpretations expand the horizons of any investigation into the
operations of royalty associations. Indeed, the CLC noted in their submission to
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this review that there are currently around 45 different Aboriginal corporations
within the CLC jurisdiction receiving moneys under ss,35(2), 35(3) and 35(4).
These organisations have memberships ranging from seven to over 2,000 and
incomes ranging from below $3,000 to over $1 million per annum (CLC 1997:
122; Ngurratjuta/Pmara/Ntjarra Aboriginal Corporation 1998). Notably, there are
only two organisations within the CLC jurisdiction that currently receive areas
affected moneys. Whereas it appears that within the CLC jurisdiction a policy has
evolved of creating small associations specifically to receive mining agreement
rent moneys and statutory rental moneys, in the NLC jurisdiction the tendency
has been to disburse all moneys, be they statutory or non-statutory payments, to
a single incorporated entity. The net effect, dependent on the definition of royalty
association applied, is that the quantum amount of money derived from mining is
greater in the NLC region where there are fewer royalty associations, or
organisations in receipt of mining moneys, than in the CLCregion.
Notwithstanding the importance of reviewing the accountability and
effectiveness of the smaller associations and the impact of negotiated royalties
and rent moneys, the major focus here is on those organisations historically
referred to as 'royalty associations'. This refers to associations that receive
statutory MREs, disbursed pursuant to ss.35(2) of the ALRA which have become
known as 'area affected' money. In most cases negotiated agreement moneys and
rent have also been paid to these organisations.
Those royalty associations are listed in Table 5. That Table also details the
Act under which each organisation is incorporated, the date of incorporation and
the amount, or estimated amount, the organisation has received pursuant to
ss.35(2) over the last ten years. Some of these organisations are incorporated
under the Commonwealth's ACAA, while others, in the most part the longer
established, are incorporated under the NT Associations Incorporations Act 1978
(AI Act) and its preceding ordinance.
The operations of royalty associations have been largely unreviewed.
Although a number of studies have focused on specific royalty associations (e.g.
Gagudju, Nabarlek Traditional Owners Association (NTOA)), a broad and
comprehensive review of their role and operations has not been pursued despite
the importance of these organisations within the financial regime of the ALRA.
There has been an evident reluctance by both the Commonwealth and land
councils to work together to improve the effectiveness of royalty associations, even
when outcomes have been poor (Altman 1996a: 46). Therefore, little can be said
about these bodies due to the paucity of available information about their
operations and because the utilisation of moneys paid to 'areas affected' has not
been rigorously assessed. It has been argued in the past that the reluctance to
review the operations of royalty associations (by both land councils and the
government) is linked to political expediency—some of the most articulate and
influential indigenous leaders in the NT are members and office bearers of the
associations (Altman and Dillon 1988: 141).
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Table 5. Royalty association incorporation details and receipts of
ss.35(2) moneys, 1987/88 to 1996/97
Association
NLC region
Gagudju
Gundjehmi
Gumatj
Dhanbul
Rirratjingu
Lahynhapuy
Dhimurru
GEAT
Non-active
Kunwinjku
NTOA
CLC region
Ngurratjuta
GMAAAC
ALC region
GEAT
Amangarra
Notes: a. Some of the
Incorporating
legislation
AI Act (NT)
ACAA
AI Act (NT)
AI Ord (NT)
ACAA
AI Ord (NT)
ACAA
AI Ord (NT)
AI Act (NT)
ACAA
ACAA
ACAA
AI Ord (NT)
ACAA
Date of
incorporat'n
8/9/80
14/7/95
10/7/79
12/10/72
23/8/85
17/10/85
8/9/92
21/8/69
/1/82
5/4/88
23/8/85
31/1/90
21/8/69
7/6/94
Income
($ mill.)
17.57
1.76
10.23
.19
2.33
1.61
0.30
9.97
14.40
2.56
6.50
7.17
12.60
8.34
Period
(except 95/96)
(95/96 to 96/97)
(88/89 to 90/91)
(92/93 to 96/97)
(est since 1993)
(87/88 to 90/91)
(all repts to 93)
(87/88 to 91/92)
(9 1/92 to 95/96)
(94/95 to 96/97)
above figures may include lease agreement payments.
b. The amounts shown in the above table for the royalty associations in the NLC and CLC
Sources:
regions are derived primarily from the NLCand CLCresponses to the reviewer. There are a
number of discrepancies when compared with other research due to the timing,
methodology and inclusion of other payments. The NLC response to the reviewer did not
specify any payments to the Dhimurru Aboriginal Corporation. It appears that the
disbursement of royalty equivalents is via the Gumatj Association. Payments to Dhimurru
were also identified by Martin (1995).
Anindilyakwa Land Council annual reports 1992 to 1997: Airman and Smith 1994: Martin
1995; NLC and CLC responses to reviewers questions (March 1998): Gumatj Association
financial statements.
What is apparent is the diversity of the administrative and commercial
operations of the royalty associations. The ambit of operations is, in most cases,
much wider than receiving MREs and making use of them. Many royalty
associations have incorporated Community Development Employment Program
(CDEP) schemes in their operations (e.g. Gumatj, Ngurratjuta), while others have
developed intricate corporate structures with a focus on commercial development
(e.g. Gagudju). Most provide services, in many cases housing, to their members.
The Dhanbul Association which began as an incorporated body to receive
royalties has since become Yirrkala's community council (Altman 1983: 134).
Inherent in the expansion of royalty association operations, is that the
organisations receive ATSIC grants to facilitate projects under the CDEP,
Community Housing and Infrastructure Program (CHIP), National Aboriginal
Health Strategy (NAHS) and Health Infrastructure Priority Projects (HIPP)
schemes. This means that they have accountability requirements outside the land
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rights regime. At the same time many of the services provided by royalty
associations are funded by the areas affected moneys.
In their study of the NTOA, Altman and Smith (1994) identified a number of
key problems that have the potential to recur in similar organisations:
• governance problems: determining the membership, the directors and the
managing director and ensuring an appropriate standard of behaviour from
these three groups;
• expenditure versus investment: the satisfying of present needs by current
expenditure as opposed to the potential benefits of deferred expenditure
through savings and profitable investment: and
• the role of the external agencies: these include the land council, ATSIC, the
Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations and the NTRegistrar-General.
Most of what is known suggests that the performance of royalty associations
has generally been disappointing. There has been an apparent lack of
transparency, planning, focus and outcomes in their operations and historically
they have been poorly managed.
Public or private moneys
This issue was dealt with in Part I under the heading of the ABR.
Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that the payment of the 30 per cent areas
affected moneys was intended as direct compensation whereas the allocation of
30 per cent from which grants could be made for the benefit of Aboriginal people
in the NTis more broadly compensatory and was also partially intended to ensure
that significant income differentials did not arise between different Aboriginal
groups (Altman 1985: 243).In other words, the validity of the argument of MREs
being compensation moneys is best sustained in respect to areas affected moneys.
From this point of view it is argued that the funds received by these
Associations lose their status as 'public funds'. Therefore the onus for
accountability of the Associations is to the Aboriginal community, in which case
general corporate regulation responsibilities apply. The issue of accountability to
members becomes a major problem for these organisations as the ALRA does not
make it clear whether they receive MREs under ss.64(3) as compensation
payments or as a share of mineral rent, and whether they are expected to utilise
these moneys in any particular way (Altman and Dillon 1988: 141).
On the other hand, there are suggestions that there should be more effective
scrutiny and regulation of the financial affairs of these entities than is presently
provided for under the ALRA as they are public moneys paid out of CRF. These
suggestions are also raised in the context of issues of the poor performance of the
royalty associations, including lack of transparency, complaints by members,
mismanagement and fraud.
At the same time the distinction between statutory and non-statutory
moneys need to be taken into account. Moneys such as those negotiated through
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agreements and rent are arguably more private than MREs and hence less legally
amenable to external accountability (Altaian 1996b: 8). Indeed, under s.44A(l) the
legislation specifies that 'terms and conditions agreed upon under s.42 or s.43, or
determined under s.44, shall include terms and conditions requiring the payment
by the applicant of compensation for damage or disturbance caused to the
relevant Aboriginal land, and to the traditional Aboriginal owners of the land, by
exploration activities undertaken on the land...'. Notably, compensation is
explicitly specified in relation to exploration activities. These negotiated agreement
moneys are provided as an inducement to traditional owners to trade away their
de facto property rights in minerals provided by the veto. Conceptually, this
suggests a 'private' and confidential arrangement between the land owner and
developer.
Mining royalty equivalents
Under the current regime the ABR disburses MREs in accordance with
ss.64(3) to the relevant land council in which the mining operations are located.
Pursuant to ss.35(2), the land council is required to determine the appropriate
incorporated councils or associations to receive the areas affected moneys and to
release the moneys to that entity. The ALRA requires that the land council take
such action within six months of receiving the moneys or otherwise seek
ministerial direction.
Table 6 specifies the total amounts disbursed from the ABR to the relevant
land council pursuant to ss.64(3) between 1978 and 1997.
Table 6. Disbursements from the ABR to land councils under ss.64(3),
1978-97
Land council Dollars ($)
NLC 73,116,808
CLC 16,244,019
ALC 20,532,166
Notes: a. The TLC has not received any funding under ss.64(3).
b. $6.340.309 has been levied in MWT against ss.64(3) disbursements.
c. Prior to the establishment of the ALCin 1991. ss.64(3) disbursements derived from GEMCO
were received by the NLCfor distribution to the areas affected on Groote Eylandt.
Source: ABR.
The income differentials of moneys received under ss.35(2) of the royalty
associations from areas affected moneys are wide. The Gagudju Association,
which receives moneys derived from mining of uranium at the Ranger Mine, has
received the highest total amount with an estimated $40 million. Since 1980
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Gagudju has received an average income in excess of $2 million. Other
Associations receive less than $1 million per annum. These income differentials
are attributed mainly to the type of mineral commodity, its market value, the
scope of the mine and its production and the royalty rate.
Negotiated royalties
Pursuant to ss.35(3) moneys received by a land council under
s.42,43,44,46,48A,48b or 48D are to be paid within six months of receipt in
accordance with the agreement. If the agreement makes no specific application
provisions, these moneys are distributed to Aboriginal councils, or incorporated
groups or communities affected by the agreement, in such proportions as the land
councils determine.
A number of studies have attempted to quantify these receipts (see Industry
Commission 1991; Kauffman 1997). The CLC (1997: 130) quantified negotiated
royalties receipts in its region between 1982/83 and 1995/96 to $36.4 million,
however this appears to be a composite amount of receipts pursuant to ss.35(3)
and 35(4) and other receipts but do not include MREs. The NLCrecord a figure of
$8.4 million (for the period 1982/83 to 1996/97) specially referred to as
contractual payments under the heading of mining. It is a particularly difficult
exercise to quantify receipts of these payments to each individual royalty
association given the many recipient organisations receiving these moneys, the
variations in the negotiated agreements and the non-monetary aspects of these
agreements. It is also difficult to distinguish statutory and non-statutory mining
receipts in the financial statements of the royalty associations that receive both.
Rather than attempt to quantify the amount of these moneys received by royalty
associations the important issues are the actual and potential use of these
moneys.
The amount and usage of negotiated agreement moneys and rent can be
observed in relation to the Djabulukgu Association. The association was
established to receive mining moneys from the Jabiluka Uranium mine. The mine
is not yet in production, so areas affected moneys under ss.35(2) have not been
paid. The Industry Commission (1991: 391) noted that the association had
received, or will receive, under its original agreement signed with Pancontinental:
$1 million up-front (after ministerial approval); $800,000 for NLC administration
costs; $1.2 million annually (years 2,3,4) after project approval; $1.2 million after
sale of 3,000 tonnes yellowcake per year for the first five years; $3.4 million on
commencement of production; and $500,000 per annum credited against
royalties. A significant amount of interest has accrued over the years as the funds
received after signing the agreement were invested in the early 1980s and have
largely been expended by the Association.
Under the objectives of the original agreement with Pancontinental the
moneys can be applied to funding of Aboriginal business, housing, educational
scholarships, community amenities and basic utilities, transportation and
communication systems, development of outstations, and the provision of group
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health insurance and a hospital scheme (Altman 1983:132). The association has
commercial interests in the region and a stakeholding in a hotel near Kakadu.
Notably, the services and projects where moneys can be directed under the
agreement could arguably be described as the public sectors domain and suggest
a reliance on these moneys for self-sufficiency.
Gate moneys
Rental payments are made by the Commonwealth and NT Governments
under lease agreements. In the NLC jurisdiction rentals are accrued from Kakadu
National Park (Commonwealth), Nitmuluk National Park (NT) and Gurig National
Park (NT). In the CLC jurisdiction there are no NT National Parks and moneys are
derived only from the agreement with the Commonwealth for Uluru-Kata Tjuta.
Under the lease agreements a percentage of entry and camping fees are paid to
the traditional Aboriginal owners. Revenue is also derived from commercial
activities in the parks such as from the Seven Spirits Bay tourist resort in the
Gurig National Park. There is potential that further and extended lease
agreements will be entered into following the resolution of outstanding land
claims (e.g. Goodparla).
The NLC (1997: 54) noted that from a financial perspective, income from
parks have delivered the greatest improvement in financial returns to traditional
owners. Considered solely as commercial operations, parks have been an
unqualified success. The income from concessions, which has risen steadily since
1986/87, is indicative of not only the commercial opportunities that parks provide
but of the increasing potential for engagement by traditional owners in such
commercial opportunities (NLC 1997: 54).
Table 7 provides financial information about lease payments for Uluru and
Kakadu for the years 1990/91 to the third quarter of 1997/98.
Parks Australia North qualified these amounts by noting that the Uluru
figures from 1994/95 onwards were obtained from commitment and expenditure
reports, and that the 1993/94 figures were calculated from 25 per cent of park
use fees receipted plus the annual rental of $150,000. The 1994Uluru lease
agreement allowed for an annual payment of $150,000 to be indexed from May
1990 to January 1994.Prior to the 1991 Kakadu lease agreement, where an
annual payment of $150,000 was agreed and indexed from May 1988 to January
1991, a nominal annual rental of $1 was paid.
The question of how these moneys are and could be utilised was raised by
the KRSIS (1997) in respect to the lease moneys received by traditional owners
from Kakadu National Park. The report noted the need to review how the Park
rent and revenue share payments should be utilised to ensure some consistency
with the accountability required of financial flows from mining activity on
Aboriginal land (KRSIS 1997: 33).KRSIS (1997: 34) recommended that the NLC
assess the application of moneys paid for the lease of Kakadu National Park by
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Parks North and encouraged a regime to be established that considered the
application of the moneys for community benefit.
Table 7. Uluru-Kata Tjuta and Kakadu lease payments 1990/91 to third
quarter 1997/98
Year
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96
1996/97
1997/98 (to 3 1/3)
Lease Payment
Uluru-Kata Tjuta
301,734
444,327
484,835
888,938
962,502
928,874
1,176,700
1,014,655
Kakadu
251,611
446,692
507,029
541,178
618,756
975,881
1,542,755
1.063,786
Source: Parks Australia North.
There is an apparent need to improve the accountability of these moneys
and their application. Potentially these receipts could be paid into the ABR to
enhance investment potential for the benefit of Aboriginal traditional owners.
However, this would be dependent upon the nature and the charter of the ABR.
Alternatively, the gate moneys could be directed to royalty associations to
enhance their investment capabilities.
Other moneys
As noted above, due to the diversification of operations by royalty
associations, most are in receipt of funds from government agencies for a variety
of functions. Some have also established commercial enterprises from which
income is accrued.
From an assessment of examples of royalty association's financial
statements, and other research, the following other sources of income have been
identified:
• negotiated agreement (both monetary and non-monetary);
• negotiated royalties;
• ATSIC program funding (primarily CDEP and CHIP);
• other Commonwealth funding;
• NTGovernment funding;
• income from investment and commercialenterprises; and
• other royalties (e.g. from quarries).
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Public accountability
Accountability of royalty associations has both historically and
comparatively received less scrutiny than the land councils or the ABR.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that royalty associations are held publicly
accountable under two regimes—under the ALRA and under the legislation which
incorporates them. Furthermore, royalty associations receiving funding from
government agencies are additionally accountable to the funding agency in
respect to the use of specific grant moneys.
Pursuant to ss.35A(l) and (2) of the ALRA the incorporated entities which
receive moneys paid out under s.35 must lodge financial records with the land
council. S.35A(2) defines 'relevant financial statements' to mean the financial
statements required by the law under which the Aboriginal community or group
was incorporated. The ALRA does not prescribe what should happen if these
records are not lodged with the land council. Nevertheless, the NLCargues that
both sections imply:
• an accountability relationship with the NLC in that associations must
provide copies of their audited financial statements relating to the year in
which these moneys were received; and
• an accountability of the land councils because they are in turn scrutinised
to ensure that a proper determination under s.35(2) is made.
The NLC also argue that in conjunction with S.35A it is clear these
requirements imply an intention by Parliament that the land councils be aware of
the financial position of royalty associations, and for the association to
demonstrate how distributions are being utilised to improve the welfare of
members, and ameliorate the impact of mining on the affected communities.
However, no real direction is provided by the ALRA and these conclusions are
arrived at only by implication (NLC 1997: 133). The NLC also noted that where the
association does not comply with the ALRA, land councils have no power to
pursue the matter except to withhold the payments although this avenue is not
specified in the legislation.
A further deficiency noted by the NLC was that the ALRA does not specify
when the financial statements are to be lodged. This matter could be dealt with by
specifying a lodgement date or lodgement time frame in either the legislation or
regulations.
The NLC has been criticised by the ANAO (Auditor-General 1993/94: 11) for
taking only limited action, as required by S.35A, to receive or monitor the
financial statements from Aboriginal associations who receive payments under
s.35. However, the land councils are extremely limited under the current
legislation as to what action can be pursued. Because the ALRA still does not
specify what the land councils should do when irregularities or audit
qualifications are detected, the expectations and responsibilities of the land
councils remain ambiguous (NLC 1997: 134).
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In order to rectify the inadequacies of the legislation the NLC has
recommended:
• That the practicable period for the lodgement of financial statements be
specified in S.35A of the ALRA as being within six months after the end of
each financial year, namely by 31 December of each year.
• In the event that financial statements are not lodged in this period, the land
councils be given the power to withhold the distribution of royalties to
associations and that this be specified under s.27 of the ALRA.
• That the land councils are empowered to request additional relevant
financial material as a complementary process to submitting annual audited
financial statements.
• That s.23 or S.35A is amended to clarify and formalise a role for the land
councils in providing support, financial advice and assistance to royalty
associations.
• That s.25 and s.27 are strengthened to require the land councils to withhold
royalty distributions from associations if they are assessed as not meeting
the land councils' criteria for financial stability and accountability.
The CLC has different views to that of the NLC and emphasised a policy of
self-determination rather than any active engagement with royalty associations.
However, the CLC has not yet faced the same range of disputes over areas affected
moneys as the NLC. Nor have they experienced the same criticisms as the NLC in
dealing with the affairs of royalty associations. Indeed, in a letter to this review
dated 30 March 1998, the CLC stated that both Ngurratjuta and the Granites
Mine Affected Area Aboriginal Corporation (GMAAAC) have an excellent record of
compliance with S.35A.
The ATSIC submission to this review suggested that royalty associations
should be accountable under the regulatory regimes for incorporated bodies and
be subject to trust law in the normal way. Regulatory authorities should
cooperate with land councils and the royalty associations to improve compliance
standards. ATSIC did suggest that some additional supervision through land
councils could be argued and recommended that the land councils and regulatory
authorities should cooperate to assist royalty associations to achieve appropriate
standards of management and accountability and compliance with regulatory
requirements. ATSIC's submission, together with others, noted the need for an
examination of the effectiveness of the relationship established by S.35A of the
ALRA between the royalty associations and the relative land councils, in terms of
the monitoring of the financial status of royalty associations.
There are other considerations for the land councils. Land councils may not
wish to get too close to the activities of royalty associations because this places
them in the invidious position of being in potential direct conflict with their
constituents. It might be preferable to allow government to monitor the activities
of these associations. But this would require statutory amendment (Altman
1996b: 8). Walter and Turnbull (1993) recommended that the ABR be chartered
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with the responsibility of monitoring both land council and royalty association
financial statements. The monitoring of the land council financial statements
occurs quarterly since the introduction of guidelines in 1996. However, no
statutory or policy mechanism has been introduced to monitor and follow-up the
operations of royalty associations.
Some previous attempts have been made to clarify the responsibilities of
land councils. The former Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (Tickner), indicated in a
letter to the land councils that the statutory duty is not satisfied with the receipt
of the financial records. The implication was that there is a duty to ensure that
the recipient bodies have 'done the right thing' with the moneys they receive (CLC
1997: 124). The dilemma is that under the current legislative framework it is not
explained how such moneys are to be utilised. Hence there is a need to specify
that the broad objectives of ss.64(3) moneys are to ameliorate the impact of
mining and to facilitate the economic development of those residing in areas
affected by mining.
It is necessary to clarify the relationship between land councils and royalty
associations in terms of accountability, monitoring and assistance requirements.
It is clear that the legislation needs to be amended so as to either dispose of the
requirement of royalty associations to furnish financial statements to the land
council and accept that accountability is satisfied through the incorporating
legislation, or to adopt similar measures recommended by the NLC and amend
the legislation to enhance the accountability regime. It would appear that under
the former, the relevant registrar would not have the necessary wide ranging
scope in functions to fulfil a 'mentoring' role. Another option would be to grant the
function to the ABR so as to allow it to receive financial statements and monitor
the royalty associations and to take follow-up action when required. It is
imperative that such a 'mentoring' role would entail assistance with planning and
advice on strategic options.
Consideration should also be given to amending the legislation so that the
recipient entities are required to lodge annual reports and record all income in an
easily readable form for both Government agencies and their constituencies.
Annual reports would be lodged with the agency to which they are accountable.
Accountability—to members
Toohey (1984: 108) noted that the land councils and Aboriginal
organisations raised the question of accountability for moneys received pursuant
to ss.64(3) and distributed pursuant to ss.35(2). He noted that it was raised with
him that when moneys left a land council they have ceased to possess any public
character. However Toohey commented That may be so; at the same time the
moneys are for the benefit of certain Aboriginals and the associations clearly have
a responsibility to them for those moneys1.
Some case studies undertaken for the review of the ACAA (Finlayson 1996;
Martin 1996)suggest that those organisations which had developed broadly
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representative structures, and had instituted procedures to maximise equity in
service delivery, participation in decision-making, and accountability to their
constituencies in achieving their objectives had also achieved at least reasonable
fiscal accountability. Conversely, those which had deficient or virtually non-
existent mechanisms to ensure such principles were more likely to demonstrate
poor financial accountability. That is, organisations which are accountable to
their members or constituencies are more likely to be effective in what they
undertake and more financially accountable.
Furthermore, while internal accountability certainly relates to such factors
as representativeness, responsiveness and equity as Rowse (1992) suggests, there
are also crucial dimensions of it which arise from the Aboriginal political and
social domain, and can be expressed for instance through relations of kinship,
familial obligations, and culturally-defined rights to speak about particular
matters. The most effective organisations appear to be those which have made
creative use of principles drawn from both domains in establishing structures and
processes which seek to maximise internal accountability (Martin and Finlayson
1996: 13).
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act (Commonwealth)
Under the ALRA, accountability to members is prescribed by its
incorporation legislation. When royalty associations are incorporated under the
ACAA there are cultural safeguards to ensure that traditional and communal lines
of accountability are acknowledged in the formation of the association. Such
cultural safeguards are not necessarily ensured under NT legislation. The risk is
that constitutions and other authoritative documents may be meaningless to
members as they may be framed in non-indigenous terms. Notably, the financial
statements of organisations, while a necessary component of any accountability
regime, are often extremely complex.
Those royalty associations incorporated under the ACAA are required to
lodge financial statements with the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations. The
documents include an independent auditor's report. The independent auditors are
all registered with the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations and are all practising
accountancy firms that are used by Australian commercial business.
The Registrar for Aboriginal Corporations provided to the reviewer financial
and other information in respect to the following royalty associations:
Ngurratjuta, GMAAAC, Rirratjingu Association, Dhimurru Land Management
Aboriginal Corporation and the Amangarra AboriginalCorporation. It is difficult to
establish whether all Associations had complied historically with the legislative
requirements as only samples of the most recent documentation were provided.
However, from the information provided it was established that most had
complied in the last four or five years.
The issue of non-compliance was raised by the Registrar with the
Rirratjingu Association in March and May 1994. The Registrar requested the
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Association to ensure the maintenance of the register of members, to ensure that
meetings are held in compliance with the Association's rules, and to ensure that
the correct processes are implemented in the authorisation of payments. This
action was taken in response to audit criticisms in the 1993/94 financial
statements. Those criticisms also noted that documentation could not be located
to confirm clan distributions for that year. Furthermore, income recorded as
royalties for the financial years 1992/93 ($310,593) and 1993/94 ($546,863)
differ from the amount of disbursement specified by the NLC ($90,000 and
$627,471 respectively). This can partly be accounted for by time lags in
distribution, and the inclusion of other payments. It is a further example of the
difficulties confronted in accessing the use of MREs and the need to clarify the
category of income.
The financial statements of the other Associations were generally
satisfactory and there were few qualifications. In the Ngrurrajuta and GMAAAC
financial statements it was easy to identify MREs received as that income was
specified as statutory mining royalty equivalent income and was not complicated
by incorporating other type of mining moneys. However, it was difficult to
establish MRE income in other financial statements. In the case of Dhimurru
royalty income is not specified although the Gumatj Association financial
statements indicate payments to Dhimurru in 1994/95 ($121,875) and 1995/96
($97,500). There is, however, an item described in the Dhimurru financial
statements as 'Contributions from Clans' which may address this income, but
again the outgoings from Gumatj are not the same as the income recorded by
Dhimurru.
Generally there is no detailing of individual cash payments in the financial
statements although almost all statements indicate allocations to outstations
without any details as to the purpose of these outgoings.
Associations Incorporation Act (NT)
There are five active royalty associations incorporated under NT legislation.
These are the Groote Eylandt Aboriginal Trust (GEAT), Gagudju Association,
Gumatj Association, Yirrkala Dhanbul Community Association Inc., and the
Laynhapuy Homelands Association. The now defunct Kunwinjku Association was
also incorporated under NT legislation as is the Djabulukgu Association, which is
yet to receive areas affected moneys.
An investigation of the files held by the NT Registrar-general was
undertaken by the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) to
determine compliance of these organisations in submitting annual financial
statements. It was found that the organisations have an impressive record of
compliance. Both Gagudju and Gumatj had met all requirements and the other
organisations had missed only one or two lodgements in recent years (this could
possibly be due to the Registrar's office in not filing them). However, there did
appear to be some problems with compliance back in the early 1980s as GEAT
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lodged all previous years records only in 1981. This has certainly been rectified
since.
Notwithstanding this impressive recent record of compliance in submitting
financial statements to the relevant registrar, there are particular limits to what
action the registrars can pursue. Even then there is evidence that actions might
not be pursued. As outlined by Altman and Smith (1994) in the Kunwinjku
Association and NTOA cases, a host of monitoring and support agencies clearly
failed to exercise adequate care, including (in no particular order) the NT
Registrar-General's Department in Darwin, the Office of the Registrar of
Aboriginal Corporations in Canberra, DAA(and ATS1C since 1990), the NLC and
Ministers for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs. External agencies may
have excuse to directly intervene when required, although it is difficult to clearly
identify an independent arbiter to decide when intervention is justified or needed.
It is also difficult to determine which agency has responsibility over particular
issues {Altman and Smith 1994: 28).Rather than such involvement being
initiated in response to crises situation or in response to audit criticisms, a more
formalised and constructive role might prove to be of considerable assistance to
royalty associations.
Distribution
Due to the lack of transparency in royalty association fiscal distributions
which is countered by the argument that disclosure is not required due to the
private nature of the moneys, it is difficult to establish exact details of recipients
and actual distributions by royalty associations. The financial statements
provided to respective registrars do not necessarily detail the specific categories of
income from development nor do they specify individual cash payments.
At a general level it is known that MREs and other mining derived income is
applied to:
• community services and infrastructure;
• commercial enterprises and investments;
• vehicles and other transportation;
• running costs of the association and other entities within the corporate
structure;
• ceremonial and cultural activities;
• trusts for educational activities;
• individual cash payments; and
• other organisations within, or close to, the area affected.
Policy guidelines on distribution
At a general level, distribution of areas affected moneys by royalty
associations has attempted an amalgam of investment, community services.
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infrastructure and individual payments. In some cases, such as in the Kakadu
and Gove regions there have been further distributions to other organisations (e.g.
Gundjehmi to Gagudju, Gumatj to Dhimurru and others). In most cases areas
affected moneys have also been utilised for running costs of the royalty
associations.
The CLC have noted that the two royalty associations in its jurisdiction,
Ngurratjuta and GMAAAC, apply their funds to community purposes and
investments only, in accordance with the relevant rules of the association.
Currently, no payments are made to individuals by either of these associations
although we are informed that the practice has occurred in the past in respect to
negotiated agreement moneys in regards to Ngurratjuta.The CLChas adopted the
view that these funds are for community benefits rather than for the benefit of
traditional land owners alone.
In the Top End there is a history of cash payments being made to
individuals while, at the same time, there is evidence of more aggressive
investments as well as the use of MREs for community facilities and services. In
the most part, those organisations which operate primarily as a royalty
association due to their reliance on MREs (e.g. Gumatj, Gagudju, GEAT) specify
the type or proportion of MREs to be used for investment purposes in their
constitutions. The Gagudju Association constitution provides for the Association
'to transact or carry on all types of business and in particular in relation to the
investment collection and receipt of money and the sale and purchase of property
of any kind whatsoever'. The Gumatj constitution allows it 'to invest all or any of
the funds of the Association in any investment'. The original GEAT constitution
specified 50 per cent to be invested, however the amended constitution of1997
only notes that the funds of the Association may be invested in any investment
permitted by law.
The findings of Justice Martin of the NT Supreme Court in respect to the
use of funds by GEAT are instructive. Justice Martin found that there were 88
family groups who belong to the 13 clans identified in the Trust Deed. The Trust
is essentially a charitable trust. Its funds must only be spent on the education,
benefit, welfare, comfort and general advancement in life of eligible Aboriginal
persons. Funds cannot be used for the benefit of a particular Aboriginal person or
persons, which is not beneficial to the community. Justice Martin elaborated on
this finding by stating that GEAT funds could be used for medical, funeral, and
church purposes. They could be used for old aged/pensioner and handicapped
purposes, for homeland grants, including the purchase of vehicles to move from
the centres to outstations, for education purposes, including adult education, for
sport and recreation, for ALC purposes including environmental and sea
management courses, for the payment of power and water authority charges and
for festivals and ceremonies, including the charter of aircraft to fly people to
cultural festivals, and for the purposes of the treatment of substance-abuse.
However, Justice Martin found that Trust funds could not be used for making
loans to individuals, unless the funds advanced were adequately protected, and
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were at commercial rates of interest (Flynn J. vs Mamarika, NT Supreme Court
No. 132 of 1995 Martin CJ 20 March 1996).
Individual payments/community facilities
Woodward (1974) did not specifically state for what purposes negotiated
royalties and affected areas moneys should be used, but he did make it clear that
these moneys were not to be distributed to individuals and were for the collective
use of communities and groups. Implicit in Woodward's recommendations was a
belief that royalties should be equitably distributed and that traditional owners of
areas affected should not have preferential status over residents of these areas.
While he did not specify how royalties should be used to lessen the impact of
mining, there is little doubt that he intended the moneys to be used to bring the
standard of community facilities, etc, closer to the level that would be created in
the nearby mining towns and Australian standards generally (Altman 1983: 111).
A number of the royalty associations have succumbed to the political
pressure and relative poverty of their members and made payments to
individuals. The amount of all distributions to individuals over time cannot be
quantified. In some instances we suspect that the recording of payments to
outstations may in fact be payments to individuals. From past research we are
aware that the Gagudju Association, which has actively supported outstation
development and other regional community development goals, has made
conservative distributions of cash to its adult members, which never exceeded
$2,000 per annum so as not to jeopardise Social Security entitlements (Altman
1996a). In most cases it is difficult to establish whether payments to individuals
are derived from the more 'public' type MRE moneys or 'private' negotiated
agreement moneys as in most financial statements there is no specification of the
exact source of the income. Furthermore, it should be noted that associations
could readily make payments to individuals from the revenue of their commercial
arms.
Payment of both MREs and agreement moneys to individuals has arguably
reduced the opportunities of royalty associations to accumulate capital and invest
for the future. On the other hand, while negotiated payments may be significant
in some cases, when consideration is given to how the moneys can best be applied
to ensure an agreeable benefit for all members, the payment of cash may prove to
be the most equitable. Of course this position is supported by the interpretation of
those moneys being private. However, given the amount of the total receipts and
that the income is limited to the life of a mine, opportunities to accumulate
resources is severely restricted when individual payments are made. There is a
need to clarify the nature of both MREs and negotiated moneys and the point at
which they do become private.
Of particular concern, if a policy is adopted to discourage individual
payments is the practice of some royalty associations in distributing moneys to
other Aboriginal organisations. This practice occurs in the Kakadu region where
the recently established Gundjehmi Aboriginal Corporation, which was
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legitimately established as Gagudju was considered to be an unsuitable entity to
receive ss.35(2) moneys, disburses funds to the Gagudju Association (Altaian
1996a). It also occurs in the Gove area where the Gumatj Association distributes
funds to other organisations in the area. While the practice may be legitimate
from a perspective that the funds are being forwarded to other organisations for
reasons such as providing services, the funds, once disbursed from the royalty
association, immediately become private and the recipient organisation is free to
distribute the funds, as they wish. This might include making payments to
individuals, unless there is a formal agreement or contract as to the usage of the
funds by the originating royalty association.
Investment
Most royalty associations have some form of investment which may or may
not be predicated on a strategic policy. The CLC (1997: 122) notes that the
concept of investment is difficult for traditional people to understand and it is
difficult to see its relevance when there are so many unmet needs. Nevertheless,
the investments undertaken by royalty associations allude to their recognition
that the payment of MREs has a time limit and strategies need to be put in place
for the organisation to evolve beyond that time limit.
It is generally recognised that some royalty associations have been relatively
commercially successful with their investments, while others have been outright
failures. In some situations impressive regional developments have occurred while
there is also evidence of failures, in terms of regional economic development, as
with the Kunwinjku Association in Western Arnhem Land. Until quite recently,
the Gagudju Association was, arguably, regarded as the most successful post-
land rights royalty association in the NT. Such positive assessments have been
made primarily by academic social sciences researchers (Stanley 1982; Altaian
1983; O'Faircheallaigh 1988; Altaian and Dillon 1988) rather than on the basis of
close financial scrutiny (Altaian 1996a: 9) or indepth research with members.
These assessments have been based, first and foremost, on the Association's
ability to meet diverse goals. It has invested heavily in the regional economy,
especially in tourism enterprises and now owns two of the three major hotels in
the region. The Association has historically been favourably assessed as an
association that has wisely utilised mining moneys for the benefit of its members,
while also investing for the future (Altaian 1996a: 6). However, more recent
assessments have pointed to the vulnerability of the organisation (Lewis 1996;
Altaian 1996a).
The Ngurratjuta Association is also acknowledged as a successful royalty
association although its income has been comparatively moderate compared with
Gagudju. The Association has a range of diverse investments including residential
properties in Alice Springs, the establishment of Ngurratjuta Air, and a portfolio of
shares, mortgage trusts and unit trusts (Marshall 1994; Floreani 1998). As
Floreani (1998) notes, some of the organisation's investments have been
successful and others have not. Ngurratjuta has liquidated Yarringka Air
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(helicopter business) and is re-assessing its investment in Glen Helen Lodge. The
reality is that royalty associations operating in a commercial environment are
open to both the benefits and pitfalls of the market place.
Both ATSIC (1998) and the NT Government (1998) submission noted the
need to encourage investment. ATSIC suggested that royalty associations should
be encouraged to balance the use of trust moneys between short-term
expenditure for current needs of beneficiaries and medium and long-term
investments which preserves capital and produce ongoing income and benefits
future generations. The NT Government (1998: 110-11) expressed the view that
royalty equivalent payments are often not applied for the long-term benefit of
Aboriginal Territorians and recommended a further examination into the nature
of the funds being transferred to royalty associations, the purpose of those funds,
their application and appropriate accountability.
In a recent study of the Gagudju Association, Altman (1996a) raised the
question as to whether the ALRA should specify an investment ratio for royalty
associations and categories of investment. This could be achieved by specifying a
proportion of MREs and other receipts, for example 50 per cent, to be invested by
the royalty association. Alternatively the ABR could be empowered to withhold a
proportion for investment which would be released to the royalty association as a
capitalised amount in the post-mine era, thereby assisting the viability of the
association beyond the life of the mine.
Equity
It is apparent that Woodward gave particular attention to the question of
equity in the distribution of MREs.The 40/30/30 formula was designed to ensure
a broad base of beneficiaries. Furthermore, areas affected moneys were intended
to ameliorate the impact of mining for both traditional owners and the Aboriginal
residents of the area affected. Woodward was conscious that mining moneys
could lead to significant income differentials between traditional owners and other
Aboriginal people unless they were distributed in broad equitable amounts and
applied to community purposes.
However, there is often a tension between principles drawn from wider
sociopolitical sphere, such as those of broadly-based equity and access to services
and resources, and the imperatives of the Aboriginal domain. In such
circumstances, the principle of the 'common good' which underpins notions such
as equity of access to resources and services can be rendered problematic.
Organisational structures and processes need to take into account and
incorporate the realities of localism, while still enabling effective and accountable
services to the broader Aboriginal constituency. This tension poses a fundamental
challenge both to Aboriginal organisations and to policy makers and is by no
means easy to resolve (Martin and Finlayson 1996: 13).
Such issues are particularly apt in the context of royalty associations and
the equitable distribution of areas affected moneys. The issue becomes even more
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sensitive given that many Aboriginal leaders have dual roles not only in
traditional and administrative terms but have dual membership and authority in
land councils and royalty associations. On the one hand this situation leads to
questions of conflict of interest in western terms while on the other the Aboriginal
domain permits these dual roles and authority based on traditional leadership
and ownership. This could partly be resolved by incorporating mechanisms to
enhance the internal accountability of Aboriginal organisations (Martin and
Finlayson 1996:13). Nevertheless, both land councils and royalty associations
remain exposed to criticism from bureaucrats and the broader community unless
the issue of dual organisational authority is resolved.
Transparency
In many respects there has been little transparency of the specific activities
of royalty associations and even the best appear to be extremely financially
vulnerable and operating suboptimally (Altaian cited in Reeves 1997: 9).
Transparency is intermittently linked with accountability but more strongly linked
with performance. Accountability requirements such as financial statements do
not necessarily require detailed explanations of the specific source of incomes nor
absolute precision on the usage of that income.
Most royalty associations receive mining agreement moneys and rents as
well as statutory royalty equivalents (Altaian and Smith 1994: 29). In most
instances it is very difficult to identify the exact amount paid under ss.35(2) as
opposed to other moneys especially other mining derived moneys. In examining
the financial statements held by the NT Registrar General it was found that in
many cases organisations' financial statements had not recorded royalty receipts
when advice from the land council recorded a distribution to the organisation.
It would appear that it is necessary to develop guidelines for financial
statements for both the organisations and their auditors. It might also be useful
for royalty associations to produce annual reports to explain their activities, to
satisfy the requirements of bureaucrats and clearly demonstrate to members how
income has been derived and how it has been utilised.
Areas affected
The distribution of areas affected moneys pursuant to ss.35(2) has remained
problematic throughout the existence of the ALRA. Determinations by land
councils of the area affected has proved to be a central issue in disputes between
land councils and royalty associations over the years and at times these disputes
have been taken into the courts (Altaian 1983: 1996). Issues such as the control
and usage of areas affected moneys have also been precipating causes and
influences for some 'breakaway' land council movements (Martin 1995).
The problems are multifaceted. First, whereas Woodward (1974: 114)
recommended that the three-tenths share be paid to 'communities' established
within 60 kilometres of the mineral lease, the legislation that was enacted did not
CENTRE F O R A B O R I G I N A L E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H
42 ALTMAN AND POLLACK
specify what is meant by areas affected nor did it assist with any criteria on how
it should be assessed. This has led to disputes regarding who should be included
and excluded in accessing the benefits.
Second, the membership of those recipient organisations of ss.35(2)
moneys, do not necessarily conform with the intended beneficiaries under the
legislation. This leads to considerable tension within the organisations. Third, the
ALRA specifies a dichotomy between traditional owners, who make the decisions
as to whether mining should proceed, and affected residents. Yet both are equal
beneficiaries pursuant to ss.35(2). This has led to inevitable conflict between the
two groups as to who should receive payments under the legislation. A number of
authors (Turnbull 1980; Altman 1983; Toohey 1984) have noted that the
traditional Aboriginal owners of the land, whose consent is required before a
mining interest is granted and an agreement is entered into, may not necessarily
benefit under ss.35(2).
The establishment of the Gagudju Association to receive moneys from the
Ranger mine is instructive in outlining the problems and interpretations by a land
council of the area affected by mining. Originally, the NLCtook the view that the
entire NLC region—the top half of the NT—was affected by the Ranger mine, so
the Gagudju Association was only one of many Aboriginal organisations entitled
to share in the royalties. Legal advice from within the Bureau of the NLC took a
much narrower view that only those people living in the immediate vicinity of the
mine who were traditional owners or had some other traditional attachment to the
mine area were entitled to receive royalties (Levitus 1991: 160). This
interpretation is clearly in contravention of Woodward's intent, for he
recommended that the area affected be defined as an area within 60 kilometres of
a mine site. Furthermore, this interpretation would have excluded almost the
entire Gagudju Association membership.
The Deputy Crown Solicitor in Darwin proposed a third view, that the 'area
affected' by a mining operation depended on the circumstances of each case and
was not reducible to a formula but may well extend beyond the direct physical
influence of a mine. The Deputy Crown Solicitor's opinion emphasised two other
points: first, that the ss.35(2) plainly designates residence, not traditional
ownership, as the relevant criterion for membership of a royalty-receiving
association; and second, that an association is entitled to receive royalties only if
all members are resident within the area affected (Levitus 1991: 160).
An amendment to ss.35(2)(b), based on the recommendations of Altman
(1983; 1985) and Toohey (1984), provided some guidance for determining
Association membership, by referring to people who 'live in, or are the traditional
owners of, the area affected by1 the mining operations. However, the application of
this clause has been uncertain or unsatisfactory in three respects: the boundaries
of area affected, the limits of traditional ownership, and the recognition of
residence (Levitus 1991: 161). These issues remain salient today.
More recent views of the NLC have reverted to the more narrow view of the
area affected by the Ranger mine. This has once again highlighted the problems
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with the membership of Gagudju and has been one catalyst of the recent dispute
between the NLC and Gagudju. With the suspension of ss.35(2) moneys to
Gagudju the NLC, needing to meet its requirements and release the moneys under
s.35, assisted with the creation of the Gundjehmi Aboriginal Corporation which
consists of approximately 25 traditional owners of the Ranger site (Altaian 1996a).
The NLC have recommended that:
• s.35(2) of the ALRA be amended so that the focus is on 'people affected' by
mining rather than 'areas affected' (this view was also recommended by the
KRSIS in 1997);
• s.35{2) be amended to allow the land councils to make conditional
distribution decisions, such that the distribution is conditional on certain
requirements being met by the royalty association; and
• s.25 and s.27 be strengthened to give powers to the NLC to withhold royalty
distributions from associations until any issues of recipients' grievances are
settled.
While Woodward's recommendation was not incorporated in the ALRA and
the area affected remains undefined, the spirit of his recommendation is partly
useful (Altaian 1985: 202). Despite the arbitrariness of defining affectedness as
being within 60 kilometres of a mine site, there is a view expressed, for example
by the 1984ABTA Working Party, that even an arbitrary definition is better than
none. Arguably, the focus of Woodward's recommendation was towards the Top
End where a number of mines had operated on Aboriginal land for sometime. In
this respect, while the area affected by mining will no doubt vary from mine to
mine, there are some distinct variations of the impact of mining between the NLC
and CLC region. It is therefore very difficult to specify the area affected on a
Territory-wide basis. However, it may be of use to land councils if some reference
to a spatial area was specified in the ALRA even if for guidance purposes only
(Altaian 1985: 202).
Taxation
The CLC has identified a potential problem regarding the tax position of its
Royalty Trust Account. This Trust Account is used to administer disbursements
from the ABR and other mining moneys within the CLC region before further
disbursement to the Aboriginal beneficiaries. It was believed until recently that
the exemption obtained by the CLC in respect of its status as a public benevolent
institution applied equally to the Royalty Trust. Advice is being sought on the
question as to whether the CLC is required to apply for a tax file number for the
Trust Account. If required the CLC will commence quarterly returns to the ATO.
The returns will be made in respect of payments made by the Trust, moneys held
by the Trust and for organisations. These moneys are in relation to agreements
that are leases or rental agreements and bank interest earned (CLC 1997: 125).
A recurring qualification in the audits of GEAT deal with the tax liability of
the Association. In the 1981/82 financial statements prepared by Pannell Kerr
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Forster (Chartered Accountants) it was reported that a: 'legal opinion has been
received by the association which indicates that the association is not liable to
income tax, nor responsible for deduction of withholding tax on any distribution
of royalty money originally received from Groote Eylandt Mining Company
Proprietary Limited. There has been no reported judicial authority to confirm this
opinion, and if it is not confirmed, this may expose the association to an income
tax liability or liability to recover withholding tax on any distribution made which
are deemed to be royalty distributions'. A similar, although not as detailed,
qualification was raised in the 1995/96 audit of GEAT.
These two apparently similar issues remain unresolved in the sense that
they are awaiting legal opinions or judicial confirmation. Notably the recent
decision of the Commonwealth Government to apply MWT to NTHs in receipt of
mining negotiated moneys implies that it is the government's intention to tax
these types of mining moneys at source. Any action pursued to have exemptions
from MWT applied to the ABR could incorporate exemptions to the payments
made by these public benevolent institutions.
Social Security
A long-standing concern of the Department of Social Security (now
Centrelink) has been the impact on entitlements of the receipt of mining moneys
by Aboriginal people who are in receipt also of social security benefits or CDEP
payments. The concerns relate predominantly to the failure by individuals to
disclose these amounts. Notably, royalty associations have intentionally limited
their payments to individuals within thresholds so as any social security and
other entitlements are not reduced. Nevertheless, the problem would be overcome
by disallowing cash payments of mining moneys to individuals by royalty
associations.
A further issue raised by Centrelink concerns the release of information
about Royalty receipts. It is the view of Centrelink that information regarding the
recipients of payments from royalty associations should not be openly available to
the public, but should be released to Government departments and agencies
where information is held under the protection of the Privacy Act (1988) and is
used to ensure correct payments of moneys from public revenue, and to protect
these moneys (Centrelink 1997: 5). Once again, if no further cash payments are
made to individuals, and Centrelink is informed of such a decision, then the need
for this information becomes obsolete.
Recommendations/options
Royalty associations have operated variably both over the life cycle of
individual organisations compared to other indigenous organisations and in the
context of wider political and economic forces. Under these circumstances and
given the heterogeneity of royalty association forms—both statutory and in terms
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of objectives—it is difficult to make blanket recommendations. The following
issues need to be addressed immediately.
• That royalty associations are consulted widely in respect to any
recommendations which might affect their operations, particularly in
respect to their commercial operations.
• That ss.35(2) is amended to clarify the purposes of MRE moneys. The
purpose would include that the moneys are to ameliorate impacts of
resource development projects by providing opportunities for enhanced
community development, greater participation in regional economic
development, and the creation of opportunity for future generations.
• That the relevant amendments to the ALRA be made to enhance the
accountability of royalty associations and to establish a 'mentoring' regime
within the Act. There is a need to introduce discipline to royalty associations
which would include the provision of additional reporting mechanisms
including performance indicators. The points of accountability would be to
the relevant Registrar, the land council, or the ABR,but ultimately to the
Minister.
• That guidelines be introduced for royalty association financial statements
that detail the specific source of income under the ALRA and detail the
expenditure and usage of that income.
• That royalty associations identify a clear mission/vision which is
interrelated to that of the ABR.A fundamental issue we have not addressed
is staffing of these organisations. There is a need for enhanced community
participation in activity and the separation of board and staff/expertise.
Some royalty associations are multi-milliondollar organisations operating
as community development organisations rather than business houses.
• That appropriate structures are put in place that divide commercial
activities from social activities, commercial from charitable and encourage
some alliance building with mainstream business (on a commercial front)
and other agencies, especially ATSIC regional councils but also the NT
Government, on the community development side. Discretion over dollars
should allow strategic expenditure to leverage in resources from government
that will make a real difference to people residing in areas affected.
• That a regime be instituted that discourages individual payments and
encourages investment.
• That consultations be held with ATSIC regional councils in the NT to
determine their views on substitution and the allocation of program funding
to organisations in receipt of areas affected moneys and to identify strategies
of integrated funding.
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Notes
1. The actual proportion of funds paid by the Commonwealth in respect to the Ranger
agreement is about 77 per cent of the royalties received from ERA. Although the
agreed royalty rate is 5.5 per cent which is paid to the Commonwealth, the
Commonwealth pays 1.25 per cent to the NT Treasury and 4.25 per cent to the ABR.
2. This review may be delayed due to the all encompassing review of the ALRA.
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